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While managerial performance always plays a critical role in determining 
firm performance, a manager’s importance is elevated during bankruptcy.  A 
manager in bankruptcy both runs the firm and helps form a plan of reorgani-
zation.  In light of this critical role, one would expect that bankruptcy scholar-
ship would place considerable emphasis on the role of CEO compensation in in-
centivizing managerial performance in bankruptcy; however, the opposite is 
true.  Bankruptcy scholars and practitioners tend to emphasize other levers of 
corporate governance, such as the role of debtor-in-possession financiers, rather 
than the importance of CEO compensation.  This Article seeks to revive CEO 
compensation as an important governance lever in bankruptcy.  First, the Arti-
cle examines current ideas and practices of managerial compensation in bank-
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ruptcy and finds them wanting.  The Article next proposes a novel bankruptcy 
compensation plan—debt compensation—that provides better incentives for 
managers to perform efficiently.  By granting managers a fixed proportion of 
unsecured debt in the bankrupt firm, debt compensation creates value-
enhancing incentives similar to the incentives created by the stock grants and 
stock options that are heavily employed by solvent firms to compensate managers. 
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While managerial performance always plays a critical role in de-
termining firm performance, a manager assumes a heightened role in 
bankruptcy.  In bankruptcy, the manager in control of the debtor-in-
possession makes all the decisions that the manager of an ordinary 
firm must make regarding firm operations and strategy; however, the 
manager’s role does not end there.  Instead, the manager also plays 
an essential role in forming a plan of reorganization or liquidation.  
This task involves many responsibilities, including weighing the choice 
of liquidation versus reorganization, mediating between different 
classes of creditors, and selecting the optimal capital structure for the 
reorganized firm. 
How unfortunate, then, that managerial compensation in bank-
ruptcy is so restricted.  While managers of ordinary firms receive a 
wide array of incentive compensation devices, compensation for a 
manager in bankruptcy is far more ineffectual and limited.1  In addi-
tion, managerial interests tend to be “closely aligned with the share-
holders,”2 making it unlikely that a manager will design a reorganiza-
1 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 183 (3d ed. 2001) 
(“The usual checks that keep the managers of a firm in line—the prospects of profits 
from their equity interests . . . are displaced once a bankruptcy petition is filed.”). 
2 Id. at 182. 
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tion plan that maximizes value for the creditors of an insolvent firm.  
The limitations of executive compensation in bankruptcy are echoed 
by the lack of scholarly attention to the subject.  While the question of 
executive compensation is the subject of a vast literature in both fi-
nance and law,3 analyses of corporate governance in bankruptcy tend 
to give the subject short shrift.4  In an important exception to the pat-
tern of downplaying the role of executive compensation in bank-
ruptcy, Professor David Skeel details some managerial compensation 
schemes that are prevalent in bankruptcy.5  These include “pay-to-
stay” agreements to retain key managers in the wake of a bankruptcy 
declaration6 and managerial bonuses for speedy reorganization.  In 
3 See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:  THE UN-
FULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1-12 (2004) (summarizing and cri-
tiquing the accepted theories of excecutive compensation, and referring to both the 
finance and legal literatures on point). 
4 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 673, 693-99 (2003) (arguing that creditors enjoy considerable power in 
bankruptcy); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing 
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1211 & n.4 (2006) (emphasizing 
the role of creditor monitoring in bankruptcy and contrasting that with the emphasis 
on matters of executive compensation outside of bankruptcy); Kenneth Ayotte & David 
A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456-57 (2006) (book review) (stating that “[debtor-in-
possession] financing is now the most important corporate governance lever in Chap-
ter 11” and remaining silent on the topic of executive compensation).  An important 
exception to this trend is David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball:  The “New” New Corporate 
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 920, 943-49 (2003), which addresses 
the “fairness and efficiency concerns” involved with both pre-bankruptcy executive 
compensation packages, as well as those offered after a bankruptcy petition has been 
filed.  There is no doubt that creditor controls over bankrupt corporations and man-
agers constitute an important governance lever.  Creditor control is no panacea, how-
ever, as managers will inevitably have some discretion in making choices (otherwise 
they could not “manage”). 
5 See Skeel, supra note 4, at 926-30.  Even this article, however, pays more attention 
to debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing than to executive compensation.  Id. 
6 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAP-
CPA) sharply limits the use of pay-to-stay agreements. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(c)(1) 
(West Supp. 2006) (providing that the debtor shall not make payments to insiders such 
as executives “for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor’s 
business”).  BAPCPA excepts from this rule situations where a court has expressly 
found (1) that “[t]he payment or obligation is essential to keep the person from ac-
cepting a bona fide job offer for the same or greater pay;” (2) that “[t]he person’s con-
tinued retention is essential to the survival of the business;” and (3) that “[t]he amount 
of the payment to be made or obligation to be incurred does not exceed either 10 
times the amounts paid to nonmanagement employees in the same calendar year or 25 
percent of the amounts paid to insiders in the calendar year preceding that in which 
the payment is to be made.”  Jason S. Brookner, Law Limits Executive Compensation, TEX. 
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addition, Professor Skeel mentions proposals for improving these 
compensation schemes.  Skeel states that the ideal solution would be 
to “base the managers’ pay on the overall value of the debtor’s assets 
at the conclusion of the Chapter 11 case.”7  Skeel explains that be-
cause of uncertainties regarding valuation, however, this solution will 
only be attainable when firm value is reasonably well established, such 
as in liquidation.8  Instead, Skeel proposes granting stock in the reor-
ganized company to managers; in this way, managers will have incen-
tives to maximize value.9
Unfortunately, pay-to-stay agreements, rapid-reorganization bo-
nuses, and the Skeel proposals all contain significant flaws.10  Pay-to-
stay agreements may enable the debtor to retain key managerial per-
sonnel, but they do nothing to ensure that a manager will attempt to 
maximize value.  Rapid-reorganization bonuses incentivize a speedy 
reorganization, not a value-maximizing one.  Granting a manager a 
percentage of liquidation proceeds works well if liquidation is the ob-
vious choice.  When liquidation is not the efficient option, however, 
the prospect of a percentage of the asset return in liquidation may en-
courage a manager to push for liquidation even when reorganization 
would create more value.  Finally, granting stock in the reorganized 
company skews managerial incentives in a number of ways.  First, it 
may encourage a manager to prefer reorganization when liquidation 
is a more efficient option.  Second, owning stock in the reorganized 
company means that a manager has an incentive to ensure that the 
equity of the reorganized company is of the utmost value.  This en-
courages the manager to propose reorganization plans wherein the 
reorganized company has little or no debt, even if the company would 
have a higher total valuation with some debt in its capital structure.11
LAW., May 29, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1150275918997 
(synthesizing the terms of 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(c)(1)(A)-(C)).  
7 Skeel, supra note 4, at 948. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Many bankrupt companies are currently run by “turnaround managers” who 
specialize in resuscitating distressed companies.  See, e.g., Steven F. Hodkinson, Credibil-
ity:  The Real Key to Turnaround Success, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2006, at 36 (describing 
some practices of a successful turnaround manager).  If the turnaround managers are 
hired by individuals with an interest in maximizing the value of the firm as a whole, 
rather than the claim of one class, and the turnaround managers are repeat players, 
then failures in compensation will be mitigated by the turnaround manager’s desire 
for a good reputation. 
11 If the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies, then this concern is not relevant.  
Modern corporate finance has identified several reasons why the theorem does not 
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All of these problems stem (at least in part) from a fundamental 
difficulty of granting incentive compensation in bankruptcy as com-
pared to incentive compensation in an ordinary solvent firm.  In an 
ordinary solvent firm, a manager’s fiduciary duty is associated with the 
residual claimants—the equity holders.12  As a result, equity-based in-
centive compensation plans, such as stock options, are relatively easy 
to adopt.13  By granting equity to the manager, incentive compensa-
tion aligns managerial incentives with those of the equity residual 
claimants—when the residual claimants benefit, so does the manager.  
The manager’s pecuniary incentives accord with her fiduciary duties.  
In bankruptcy, by contrast, the residual claimants (and the manager’s 
fiduciary responsibilities14) are harder to identify.  Most frequently, 
the residual claimants, and those owed fiduciary obligations, are unse-
cured creditors.15  In response, the executive compensation proposals 
apply in most cases, including tax considerations and the mitigation of principal-agent 
problems.  The wide variety of capital structures witnessed among public corporations 
suggests that capital structure matters, in spite of the Modigliani-Miller theorem.  See 
MARK GRINBLATT & SHERIDAN TITMAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 
498-99 (2d ed. 2002). 
12 Most suits for breach of fiduciary duty are brought by equity shareholders.  See, 
e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 863-64 (Del. 1985) (concerning a class action 
suit brought by shareholders against corporate directors for breach of the duty of 
care). 
13 Equity-based compensation plans have themselves come under attack over the 
last few years.  This is because the plans seldom provide the incentives for which they 
are intended.  Instead, they often serve as a vehicle for managers to extract rents from 
their corporation.  See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction 
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753 (2002) (arguing that 
both the process by which executive compensation plans are adopted and the empiri-
cal evidence regarding such plans support the claim that managers have significant 
influence over the substance of their compensation). 
14 To be precise, fiduciary responsibilities are owed to the corporation rather than 
to a group of claimants.  In reality, fiduciary duties will typically be associated with a 
group of claimants against the firm because of the difficulty of determining fiduciary 
duties to an abstract entity such as the corporation. 
15 Courts have implicitly recognized that creditors are common residual claimants 
by maintaining that corporate officers of insolvent companies have fiduciary duties to 
creditors.  For examples of such judicial recognitions, see Unsecured Creditors Committee 
of Debtor STN Enterprises v. Noyes (In re STN Enterprises), 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985); 
FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 
F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981); Thomson Kernaghan & Co. v. Global Intellicom, Inc., Nos. 90 
Civ. 3005 (DLC), 99 Civ. 3015 (DLC), 2000 WL 640653, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 
2000); Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead America Corp. v. Reliance Capital 
Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead America Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994); Brandt v. 
Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int’l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) 
(interpreting Delaware law); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-90 
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described above use some proxy for residual claimants when awarding 
compensation.  This process is subject to errors.  For example, grant-
ing the manager equity in the reorganized firm works well if the re-
sidual claimants in bankruptcy also will hold equity in the reorganized 
firm.  If, however, some of the residual claimants in bankruptcy hold 
debt in the reorganized entity, then there may be a conflict of interest 
between the manager and the residual claimants.16
To remedy these defects and reorient the scholarly debate in 
bankruptcy toward the problem of executive compensation rather 
than focusing almost exclusively on other means of corporate govern-
ance, this Article proposes a novel form of managerial incentive com-
pensation for publicly traded corporations in bankruptcy.  The unse-
cured creditors’ committee should be granted a new (conditional) 
right—the right to grant the manager a percentage of the unsecured 
debt (a “vertical strip” of unsecured debt) currently held by the credi-
tors of the firm.17  This right would be subject to several conditions, as 
described below.  Because unsecured creditors are the most common 
residual claimants in bankruptcy,18 this right would enable the resid-
ual claimants to align the incentives of the manager with their own.  
When the value of a bankrupt firm rises, it is typically the unsecured 
creditors who obtain the greatest benefit because they are the most 
common residual claimants.  Granting a manager debt in the bank-
rupt firm allows the creditors to share these gains with the manager 
and ensures that the manager has the appropriate incentive to pursue 
these gains. 
(Del. Ch. 1992); Crédit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathé Commications Corp., No. 
12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *33 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). 
16 Even when unsecured creditors hold debt in the reorganized firm, the debt that 
they receive in the reorganized firm is often worth less than the face value of the debt 
that these creditors held in the bankrupt firm, indicating that the unsecured creditors 
are the residual claimants in spite of the fact that they never hold equity. 
17 Throughout this Article, I will refer to this proposal as “debt compensation.” 
18 In a recent empirical survey of bankruptcies, unsecured creditors proved to be the 
residual claimants in over half of the Chapter 11 bankruptcies.  See Arturo Bris et al., The 
Costs of Bankruptcy:  Chapter 7 Cash Auctions vs. Chapter 11 Bargaining, at tbl.8 (EFA 2004 
Maastricht Meetings, Paper No. 5155, 2004) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=556930 (summarizing findings from a sample of cases 
from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts of Arizona and the Southern District of New 
York).  Equity holders (who share many similarities with unsecured creditors in bank-
ruptcy and can also join the debt compensation scheme as described below) were the 
residual claimants in another quarter of Chapter 11 cases.  Id.  Thus, secured creditors 
(who are not eligible for the debt compensation scheme) obtain full recovery in a 
large majority of Chapter 11 cases. 
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Granting the manager a percentage of unsecured debt solves 
many of the inefficient incentive problems generated by the plans de-
scribed above.  If a rapid reorganization increases the total value of 
the firm and thereby the total recovery for unsecured debt, then a 
manager receiving a percentage of this debt will have a greater incen-
tive to reorganize rapidly because a rapid reorganization increases the 
value of the manager’s own debt.  If a rapid reorganization destroys 
value, however, then the manager will avoid this choice, unlike a 
manager receiving a rapid-reorganization bonus.  Similarly, a manager 
receiving a percentage of unsecured debt has no incentive to ineffi-
ciently favor reorganization or liquidation.  If liquidation is the most 
efficient choice, then this will be reflected in an increase in the value 
of unsecured debt.  Because the manager receives a percentage of this 
increase in value, the manager will have an incentive to choose effi-
cient liquidation.  Finally, debt compensation protects against the 
tendency of the manager to favor equity in bankruptcy.  When the 
manager of a bankrupt company is the same person as the pre-
bankruptcy manager, that manager will have many ties to equity, 
which used to control the firm.  For example, the manager may have 
received grants of stock or stock options before the company became 
bankrupt, giving the manager a direct incentive to favor equity.  Debt 
compensation protects against the manager’s inclination to favor eq-
uity by giving the manager a direct financial incentive in the perform-
ance of debt.  If the manager favors equity and in the process destroys 
value, then the manager receiving debt compensation will experience 
a financial penalty, as the value of unsecured debt will diminish. 
Enabling the creditors’ committee to grant the manager debt is 
no panacea.  A debt compensation plan must address several con-
cerns.  First, secured creditors may be harmed by the proposal.  Debt 
compensation gives the manager an incentive to raise the value of un-
secured debt, possibly at the expense of secured debt.  The manager 
will have an incentive to take potentially value-destroying risks because 
the upside risk is enjoyed by unsecured creditors (and shared by the 
manager) while the downside risk is borne by the secured creditors 
(and not shared by the manager).19  When the value of the firm’s as-
sets is near the value of the secured debt claims alone, for example, 
19 This problem resembles the “asset substitution problem” that is commonly dis-
cussed in corporate law and finance, in which the interests of debt and equity are at 
odds.  See GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 11, at 569 (arguing that debt provides an 
incentive for firms to take on unnecessary risk because increasing a firm’s risk transfers 
wealth from the firm’s debt holders to its equity holders). 
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the likelihood that secured creditors will be hurt by value-destroying 
managerial risk taking is enhanced.  Similarly, an extraordinarily high 
award of unsecured debt gives the manager greater incentive to favor 
unsecured creditors at the expense of those who are secured.  To 
mitigate these problems, the bankruptcy judge should deny the unse-
cured creditors’ committee’s debt compensation grant under these 
circumstances.20
Second, debt compensation must be structured to avoid conflicts 
of interest among unsecured creditors.  For example, if the manager 
owns 1% of some unsecured debt but no percentage of other claims, 
the manager would have an incentive to favor some classes of unse-
cured creditors over others when forming a plan of reorganization.  
To prevent this, the creditors’ committee’s decision on the size of the 
debt compensation must bind all unsecured creditors.  Such a vertical 
strip approach means that the manager potentially holds unsecured 
debt with many different priority levels, but a constant percentage of 
each type of debt.  This creates a level playing field among unsecured 
creditors.  While some unsecured creditors may object to the loss of 
some percentage of their claims, this decision would be no different 
than many other actions taken by the creditors’ committee that have 
the potential to diminish the value of some creditors’ claims.  As a re-
sult, the binding nature of the creditors’ committee’s decision should 
not be problematic. 
Alternatively, the proposal could be modified to allow the most 
senior unsecured creditors to opt out of awarding debt compensation.  
If senior unsecured creditors are extremely confident that they will 
receive their money in any case, then they may see no need to spend 
money compensating the manager.  An opt-out provision for unse-
cured creditors would reduce the cost of the proposal.  While the opt-
out option may provide incentives for a manager to favor junior unse-
cured creditors over senior unsecured creditors, senior unsecured 
creditors will have the ability to weigh this concern when determining 
whether or not to opt out. 
Third, equity may also be concerned about debt compensation, 
since debt compensation gives the manager the incentive to favor un-
secured creditors over equity.  In some cases, this gives the manager 
the incentive to be overly cautious.  To prevent this problem, equity 
20 Alternatively, judges could approve an unsecured debt compensation structure 
on the condition that the unsecured creditors make good on any loss to the secured 
creditors. 
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should be entitled to match the percentage compensation award 
given by the creditors’ committee.  This will ensure that equity is not 
disfavored with respect to unsecured debt by the manager. 
Finally, the cost of the proposal may be a concern.  Debt compen-
sation may increase the salaries of managers in bankruptcy.  Because 
the creditors’ committee chooses whether or not to award debt com-
pensation, however, the cost of debt compensation should not be a 
major concern.  Unlike ordinary boards, the manager is unlikely to 
control a creditors’ committee.  If the committee chooses to award 
debt compensation, the decision provides strong evidence that the 
committee believes that debt compensation is worth the cost.  If the 
committee does not believe so, then it will not award a debt compen-
sation grant. 
Thus, a creditors’ committee’s right to grant debt compensation 
offers a new means to improve managerial performance in bank-
ruptcy.  In spite of a number of concerns about the proposal, it should 
be viable if adopted as described here.  Moreover, courts can adopt 
this approach conservatively at first by rejecting aggressive compensa-
tion proposals.  Then, as judges grow more familiar with the debt 
compensation procedure, the size and prevalence of the debt com-
pensation awards and their positive effects on managerial perform-
ance in bankruptcy can grow. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I outlines an example that 
will be used to illustrate many of the points developed in this paper.  
Part II examines existing managerial compensation schemes in bank-
ruptcy and discusses their flaws in greater detail.  Part III details the 
debt compensation proposal and examines how the proposal ad-
dresses many of the flaws of the existing compensation schemes de-
scribed in Part II.  Part IV discusses possible objections to the debt 
compensation proposal and details how the proposals can be modi-
fied to account for these concerns.   
I.  A HYPOTHETICAL FIRM IN BANKRUPTCY 
Many of the proposals and critiques in this Article are best devel-
oped through an example.  In order to maintain continuity, this Part 
outlines the basic framework of the example.  As the Article contin-
ues, many aspects of the example will be modified to illustrate particu-
lar points. 
Suppose that a firm (“Firm”) declares bankruptcy.  Suppose fur-
ther that: 
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Assumption 1:  Firm has three classes of claimants:  secured claim-
ants, who are owed $10 million; unsecured creditors (all of equal pri-
ority), who are owed $50 million;21 and equity claimants. 
Assumption 2:  If Firm liquidates, it will raise $20 million. 
Assumption 3:  The value of Firm if it reorganizes is more uncertain 
than the liquidation value and depends upon the actions of the man-
ager (“Manager”).22  The exact relationship between managerial effort 
and value will be developed in greater detail in later sections of this 
Article. 
Assumption 4:  Manager generally acts to maximize salary.  Man-
ager tends to favor equity because Manager owns equity (for example, 
restricted stock grants and stock options, as well as ordinary stock) 
and has a longstanding fiduciary relationship with the stockholders. 
II.  EXISTING MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION  
ARRANGEMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY 
Managers have two jobs in bankruptcy.  First, they run the corpo-
ration, just as ordinary managers do.  In addition, they form a plan of 
reorganization or liquidation.23  This typically involves a fundamental 
reshuffling of the firm’s capital structure, as well as new agreements 
with other firm stakeholders such as employees and lessors.  The 
manager’s role is therefore particularly important in bankruptcy, and 
has critical implications for all claimants on the bankrupt firm. 
21 The assumption that there is only one class of unsecured creditors is not far-
fetched.  Section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that all “substantially simi-
lar” creditors should be placed in the same class of creditors.  11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) 
(2000).  Because all unsecured claimants have the same rights outside of bankruptcy, 
there is a reasonable argument that all unsecured claimants should be in the same 
class.  See Granada Wines, Inc. v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension 
Fund, 748 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1984) (recognizing that “[s]eparate classifications for 
unsecured creditors are only justified ‘where the legal character of their claims is such 
as to accord them a status different from other unsecured creditors’” (quoting In re 
L.A. Land & Invs., Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448, 454 (D. Haw. 1968), aff’d, 447 F.2d 1366 (9th 
Cir. 1971))); BAIRD, supra note 1, at 208 (arguing that trade and deficiency claims 
should be in the same class since they are both unsecured claims and neither enjoys 
priority over the other). 
22 Throughout this Article, I will use the singular term “manager.”  Management, 
of course, often consists of several individuals.  All of the points made in this Article, 
however, apply equally well to the case of a management team as they do to a single 
manager. 
23 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (granting the debtor an exclusive right to develop a 
plan of reorganization for 120 days). 
  
788 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 777 
 
Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code24 grants considerable 
powers to the manager of a firm declaring bankruptcy.  For example, 
Chapter 11 authorizes managers to operate the firm as “debtors-in-
possession” and grants managers a window during which they have the 
exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization.25  The Bankruptcy 
Code thereby combines considerable managerial powers with limited 
managerial controls—a recipe for trouble.  It should not be surpris-
ing, then, that managerial performance in the early days of the Bank-
ruptcy Code was poor.  As Professor Skeel stated, “[m]anagers were 
playing with creditors’ money.”26
Luckily, the bankruptcy system has confronted some of these 
problems.  In his survey article, Professor Skeel describes several cor-
porate governance techniques currently in use as well as a number of 
new proposals.27  Some of these methods, such as debtor-in-possession 
financing,28 control the manager’s behavior indirectly, while others, 
such as rapid-reorganization bonuses,29 give the manager direct incen-
tives to behave in certain ways.  While all of these methods constitute 
important improvements with respect to the early Chapter 11 prac-
tices, they all retain some critical flaws. 
A.  Debtor-in-Possession Financing 
Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing allows some creditors to ob-
tain considerable leverage over a debtor-in-possession.  DIP financing 
works as follows:  Under § 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, creditors who 
provide financing to debtors in bankruptcy enjoy many enhanced 
rights (subject to court approval), such as priority with respect to all 
secured and unsecured loans and administrative expenses.30  When a 
debtor needs cash to continue operations, a prospective DIP lender 
can make numerous demands of the debtor.  These demands may in-
clude a change in management or seats on the debtor’s board of di-
24 Id. §§ 1101-1174. 
25 Id. § 1121(b).  For a detailed discussion of corporate governance in Chapter 11, 
see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION:  A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMER-
ICA 160-83, 212-37 (2001). 
26 Skeel, supra note 4, at 920. 
27 See id. at 919-20 (outlining Skeel’s discussion of corporate governance in the 
context of bankruptcy). 
28 Id. at 923-26 (outlining the structure of DIP financing). 
29 Id. at 928 (describing the growing practice of giving managers bonuses for 
quickly selling a debtor’s assets). 
30 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1), (d) (2000). 
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rectors.31  Thus, if a manager will need DIP financing, her behavior is 
constrained by the prospect that the DIP lender will demand a change 
in management if the manager’s performance is weak. 
DIP financing thus provides a useful check on managerial behav-
ior.  However, it does not come close to providing a comprehensive 
solution to the problem of managerial performance in bankruptcy.32  
First, DIP financing comes with its own flaws, such as the possibility of 
overinvestment.33  Second, not all debtors need DIP financing.  When 
the debtor does not require cash to operate,34 a manager is unlikely to 
submit to the requirements of DIP lenders.  Third, DIP lenders are 
not ideal monitors of managerial performance.  Because DIP lenders 
enjoy enhanced priority, they may not be particularly interested in the 
firm’s performance, as they are guaranteed repayment in almost all 
eventualities.  Even if the DIP lender is not assured of repayment, it 
will be risk averse because, as a super-secured creditor, it only risks 
nonpayment if the firm’s assets fall in value.35  In either case, the DIP 
lender is unlikely to pressure the manager to make value-maximizing 
decisions because the DIP lender is not the residual claimant.  This 
tendency will be exacerbated when the DIP lender is already a large 
creditor of the bankrupt firm.36  If this is the case, then the DIP lender 
31 Skeel, supra note 4, at 931. 
32 Large DIP lenders include J.P. Morgan and GE Capital, which were both in-
volved in making multibillion-dollar DIP loans to WorldCom and Kmart.  Daniel Gross, 
WorldCom Is Bankrupt; So How Did It Get a $2 Billion Loan?, SLATE, July 24, 2002, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2068443. 
33 The knowledge that DIP financing can be obtained after all assets have already 
been secured can lead a firm to overinvest in current projects, secure in the knowledge 
that if a profitable future opportunity arises, the firm will be able to find financing.  
For a general discussion of DIP financing, see George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regu-
lation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993). 
34 Debtors in bankruptcy enjoy a stay from loan repayments.  Any debtor with posi-
tive operating cash flow or significant cash reserves will therefore be able to operate in 
bankruptcy without the need for DIP lending.  Of course, companies with positive cash 
flow or large cash reserves are unlikely to declare bankruptcy.  Examples of companies 
that have declared bankruptcy with positive cash flows and cash reserves include com-
panies facing large tort liabilities, such as Johns Manville (asbestos liability) and Dow 
Corning (breast implant liability).  For a discussion of these cases, see Yair Listokin & 
Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
1435, 1443-51, 1490 (2004); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
846, 858 nn.33-34, 867 n.58, 894 n.146, 915 n.225 (1984). 
35 For a more detailed discussion of “the troublesome incentives of a DIP lender 
who faces at least some downside risk,” see Skeel, supra note 4, at 935-39. 
36 For a case in which the unsecured creditors’ committee objected to the terms of 
a DIP loan, see Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of New World Pasta Co. v. New 
World Pasta Co., 322 B.R. 560, 564 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
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may favor actions that maximize the value of its other loans, rather 
than actions that maximize the value of the firm as a whole.  Finally, 
even if the DIP lender replaces the management, someone must run 
the company.  If incentives for the new managers are not appropriate, 
then DIP financing has altered, rather than eliminated, the corporate 
governance problem for firms in bankruptcy. 
B.  Managerial Compensation 
Managerial “pay-for-performance” plans offer the potential for a 
more direct and comprehensive solution to the managerial incentive 
problem in bankruptcy.  If a manager’s pay can be aligned with the 
value she creates or destroys in bankruptcy, then the manager will 
have a greater incentive to maximize firm value.  Rather than depend-
ing on managerial goodwill to ensure proper behavior, incentive com-
pensation plans rely on managerial self-interest to stimulate good  
behavior.  Unfortunately, designing pay-for-performance plans in 
bankruptcy is tricky.  All of the existing and proposed plans suffer 
from serious flaws, suggesting an acute need for new proposals in this 
area. 
1.  Pay-To-Stay Bonuses 
Professor Skeel reviews several pay-for-performance plans.  The 
simplest of these is the “pay-to-stay” bonus.37  In order to prevent tal-
ented personnel from leaving a troubled debtor, some companies of-
fer bonuses to key managers who remain with the company through 
bankruptcy.  In addition to the troubling perceptions generated by 
granting bonuses to the manager of a newly bankrupt company, pay-
to-stay bonuses give a manager no incentives for good performance.  
If Manager of Firm received a pay-to-stay bonus, for example, it would 
have no effect on Manager’s incentives to choose liquidation (As-
sumption 2) as opposed to reorganization (Assumption 3), nor would 
it have any impact on Manager’s incentives to choose the best reor-
ganization plan under Assumption 3.  Debtor firms would be better 
served by using the money currently devoted to pay-to-stay bonuses on 
pay-for-performance plans.  These plans give managers an incentive to 
37 See Skeel, supra note 4, at 926-28 (“Despite their reservations . . . creditors in-
creasingly have concluded that they are better off paying to keep the debtor’s existing 
managers in place.”). 
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stay while also creating incentives for value-maximizing managerial 
behavior. 
2.  Rapid-Reorganization Bonuses 
The most widely used pay-for-performance measure at present is 
the rapid-reorganization bonus.38  Under this plan, a manager’s com-
pensation is tied to the speed of reorganization:  the faster the reor-
ganization, the greater the manager’s compensation.39  When firm 
value is closely correlated with reorganization speed, a rapid-
reorganization bonus properly aligns the manager’s incentives with 
those of the residual claimants, who benefit most from a rapid reor-
ganization.  In many cases, however, faster reorganizations do not 
maximize value.  If a firm’s capital structure is reorganized hastily and 
ineffectually, for example, then the firm may experience difficulties 
after it emerges from a rapid reorganization, ultimately hurting the 
value recouped by creditors.  Moreover, the rapid-reorganization bo-
nus neglects any incentive for good management during the reorgani-
zation of the company.  With no reward for effectively operating the 
company, a manager will focus primarily on a plan of reorganization.  
The firm’s operations may suffer accordingly. 
The example outlined in Part I provides an illustration of the dan-
gers of rapid reorganization.  Suppose that Manager receives a rapid-
reorganization bonus, but is otherwise compensated by a flat salary.  
Assumption 3 of this example adds that the reorganization value of 
Firm depends upon Manager’s efforts.  Suppose further that Manager 
can choose whether or not to hire consultants who will facilitate the 
reorganization process, that the consultants cost $10 million in fees, 
and that by speeding the reorganization process, they raise the value 
of Firm by $5 million.  Efficiency dictates that Manager should not 
hire the consultants because the consultants cost more than the value 
they provide.  With a rapid-reorganization bonus, however, Manager 
would choose to hire the consultants.  Manager’s salary goes up when 
reorganization is speedier, but is otherwise independent of Firm’s 
value.  As a result, our self-interested Manager would choose to hire 
the costly consultants. 
38 See id. at 928 (noting that creditors “in recent cases” have insisted on linking 
manager compensation to the firm’s “progress under Chapter 11,” and that the easiest 
way to measure this progress is by speed of reorganization). 
39 The Enron managerial pay proposal included bonuses for selling assets quickly.  
Frank Ahrens, Enron Files for New Bonuses, Severance, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2002, at D13. 
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3.  Percentage-of-Assets Compensation Plans 
Professor Skeel recognizes the need for different measures that 
“more closely link managers’ effectiveness to their bankruptcy pay,” 
and discusses some possibilities for meeting this demand.40  He asserts 
that the best measure of managerial performance is to base manage-
rial compensation on the overall value of the debtor’s assets at the 
conclusion of bankruptcy and then recommends this approach for 
bankrupt firms that undergo liquidation.41
a.  Skewed Incentives 
The “percentage-of-assets” approach, however, fails to offer a gen-
eral solution to the managerial compensation problem in bankruptcy.  
As Professor Skeel notes, the percentage-of-assets approach can be 
problematic in Chapter 11 reorganizations because it is difficult to ob-
tain an accurate valuation of the debtor’s assets at the end of bank-
ruptcy.42
The percentage-of-assets approach suffers from some other flaws 
not mentioned by Professor Skeel.  For example, it encourages man-
agers to unduly favor liquidation over reorganization.  Returning to 
the example developed in Part I, suppose that Manager’s compensa-
tion scheme calls for her to receive 1% of Firm’s assets should Firm be 
liquidated and that Manager would receive a salary of $80,000 in the 
event of a reorganization.  Suppose also that Firm will be worth  
$25 million after reorganization.  Reorganization thus realizes more 
value than liquidation.  Manager, however, prefers liquidation since 
she would receive $200,00043 in compensation, which is greater than 
the $80,000 salary she would receive after reorganization.  Because of 
this problem, the percentage-of-assets approach can only be used 
40 Skeel, supra note 4, at 948-49. 
41 Id. at 948. 
42 Id.  In this respect, the percentage-of-assets approach differs from pay-for-
performance schemes (such as stock options) outside of bankruptcy, which are easy to 
value because they are granted in a form for which the market provides a valuation.  
The debt compensation proposal described in the next Section of this Article helps 
obtain the tight link between managerial performance and compensation that Skeel 
seeks without the need to directly value the debtor’s assets at the end of bankruptcy. 
43 Recall that in liquidation, Manager would receive 1% of $20 million. 
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when liquidation is unquestionably the preferred option, severely lim-
iting this approach’s value.44
b.  Low-Powered Incentives 
The percentage-of-assets approach also specifies a very “low-
powered” and expensive pay-for-performance plan.45  To see this, 
modify Assumption 2 to allow Manager’s effort to impact Firm’s liqui-
dation value.  If Manager performs poorly, Firm is worth $10 million 
in liquidation, but if Manager performs well, Firm is worth $12 million 
in liquidation.  In these circumstances, granting Manager a percent-
age of the first $10 million of Firm is wasteful.  Firm will be worth at 
least $10 million no matter what Manager does, so granting Manager 
a percentage of the first $10 million (assuming Manager still gets 1% 
of the value of the firm) costs money while generating no incentives 
for improved performance.  Rather than granting a simple percentage 
of Firm’s assets, a better pay-for-performance plan would only grant 
Manager a percentage of the value of the debtor’s assets in excess of 
$10 million.  Under this plan, Manager only receives a bonus if her 
performance generates value; no money is wasted on paying Manager 
unnecessarily. 
The percentage-of-assets plan also fails to specify how the costs of 
CEO compensation should be shared among the firm’s various credi-
tors.  The secured creditors of Firm would dislike the percentage-of-
assets approach because their claims are only $10 million (Assumption 1) 
and Firm is guaranteed to be worth that much regardless of the qual-
ity of Manager’s performance during liquidation.  Thus, Firm’s se-
cured creditors would view the percentage-of-assets approach as waste-
ful.  Unsecured creditors, by contrast, would favor the percentage-of-
assets approach because it incentivizes Manager to create additional 
value and thus increase the amount recovered by this class of credi-
tors.  The percentage-of-assets approach must develop some means of 
allocating costs between these two classes of creditors.  For all of these 
reasons, the percentage-of-assets approach, while intriguing, does not 
44 This example is admittedly contrived.  Nevertheless, the fact that it is so easy to 
develop an example wherein the percentage-of-assets approach fails suggests that the 
approach has very limited applicability. 
45 Low-powered incentives occur when a manager does not reap a large percent-
age of the value that her efforts create.  For a discussion of low-powered incentives in 
managerial compensation and leveraged buyouts, see Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of 
Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 
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offer a promising pay-for-performance package for managers of bank-
rupt firms. 
4.  Percentage of Equity Compensation Plans 
Professor Skeel next suggests that managers receive a portion of 
the reorganized entity’s stock.46  This proposal appears to give manag-
ers strong incentives to operate the debtor efficiently.  The better a 
firm’s operations perform in bankruptcy, the greater the value of the 
reorganized entity, and therefore the greater the value of a manager’s 
portion of equity.  Nevertheless, Professor Skeel’s proposal includes 
two flaws:  it would both encourage an inefficient capital structure af-
ter reorganization and tempt the manager to understate the value of 
the firm’s equity in order to secure approval of the plan. 
a.  Inefficient Capital Structure 
Unfortunately, granting a manager a portion of the equity in a re-
organized company provides the manager with poor incentives to re-
structure the company effectively.  Rather than attempting to formu-
late a reorganization plan and financial structure that maximizes 
value for the creditors of the bankrupt firm, the manager has an in-
centive to maximize the value of the equity in the reorganized entity.  
Thus, the manager’s incentives may conflict with the creditors’ goals.  
For example, the manager has an incentive to eliminate as much debt 
as possible in reorganization.47  The less debt in the bankrupt com-
pany assumed by the reorganized company, the greater the value of 
the reorganized company’s equity.  A manager may even threaten to 
destroy value to induce creditors to cancel more of their claims 
against the reorganized debtor—clearly inefficient behavior.  Relat-
edly, a manager promised a certain percentage of the equity in a re-
organized corporation has no incentive to create a financial structure 
that maximizes the value of the reorganized entity.  Instead, the man-
ager would prefer an all-equity capital structure with no debt to dilute 
the value of her equity rights.  This behavior may be inefficient.  Re-
searchers in corporate finance have identified many advantages to 
debt as a means of mitigating a wide array of agency problems.48  If 
46 Skeel, supra note 4, at 948. 
47 Id. 
48 For an overview of some of debt’s many advantages within a firm’s capital struc-
ture, see OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 95-155 (1995). 
These advantages include (1) tax considerations (interest payments to creditors are 
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the reorganized firm holds too little debt, agency problems may prove 
formidable, thereby reducing the total value of the debtor’s assets. 
The dangers of equity compensation can be highlighted in our 
example.  Suppose that Manager gets 5% of equity in the reorganized 
Firm.  Further suppose that, by mitigating agency problems, a capital 
structure that has a debt-equity ratio of 1 to 1 makes the reorganized 
Firm worth $40 million ($20 million in debt and $20 million in eq-
uity), while an all-equity reorganized Firm would be worth $30 million 
($0 in debt and $30 million in equity).  In this context, efficiency dic-
tates that Manager should choose the debt-equity ratio of 1 to 1 be-
cause it realizes $10 million more in value.  Manager would choose an 
all-equity capital structure, however, because Manager’s return is 
higher under this structure; 5% of the $30 million in equity of the all-
equity reorganized Firm is greater than 5% of the $20 million in eq-
uity of the more evenly balanced Firm, even though Firm is more 
valuable with a debt-equity ratio of 1 to 1. 
b.  Skewed Incentives for Getting a Plan of Reorganization Confirmed 
To be confirmed by a bankruptcy court, a plan of reorganization 
must satisfy § 1123(a)(4), which requires that a plan “provide the 
same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class.”49  Eq-
uity compensation plans, however, give managers incentives to under-
state the value of equity in order to get a plan confirmed that maxi-
deductible from corporate tax obligations, while dividends are taxed at both the cor-
porate and personal levels), see Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income 
Taxes and the Cost of Capital:  A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433, 434 (1963) (demon-
strating that the tax advantages of debt financing are significant); (2) the value of pre-
venting a manager from squandering free cash flows by requiring the manager to pay 
out cash regularly in the form of interest, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 323-26 (1976) (discussing the increases in efficiency that can be won 
through investor monitoring of managers); and (3) the avoidance of the lemon prob-
lem (investors are more wary of firms issuing equity than firms issuing debt because 
investors suspect that any firm that issues additional equity must be pessimistic about 
its future prospects), see Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and 
Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. 
ECON. 187, 207-09 (1984) (concluding that, empirically, issuing debt rather than eq-
uity is better for shareholders).  Disadvantages of debt include increasing the risk of a 
costly bankruptcy reorganization or investment-skewing financial distress.  See, e.g., 
Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) Distress?  
Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 J. FIN. 1443, 1443-46 
(1998) (noting the correlation between highly leveraged transactions and debt default, 
that together lead to bankruptcy or financial distress). 
49 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2000). 
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mizes the value of their stake in the reorganized company’s equity.  
Because managers often have the best information about the com-
pany’s true value, such skewed incentives may wreak havoc with 
courts’ ability to ensure that § 1123(a)(4) is observed.50
Note that even though there is only one class of unsecured credi-
tors of Firm, some of these creditors might prefer equity in the reor-
ganized entity while others prefer debt.  Furthermore, Manager will 
have the best estimate of the true value of Firm.  Other parties must 
either rely on her estimates or expend considerable sums in develop-
ing their own estimates. 
Under these conditions, Manager might have a strong incentive to 
understate Firm’s value for two reasons.  First, as the perceived value 
of equity decreases, so does Manager’s perceived compensation.  
Manager will then have an incentive to underestimate the value of 
Firm’s equity in order to hide the true size of her compensation, thus 
avoiding any public outrage over the size of her salary.  Second, if 
Manager continues in her role after reorganization, then her future 
employers would be the shareholders in the reorganized firm.  Man-
ager might want to gain favor with her future employers by underes-
timating the value of their equity, thereby leading to windfall returns 
for those taking equity compared with those taking debt.  In total, 
these inefficient incentives may cause significant additional complica-
tions in the already arduous process of getting different creditors to 
agree to different securities in the context of a reorganization plan. 
Thus, while pay-for-performance managerial compensation plans 
in bankruptcy offer the promise of improved managerial perform-
ance, existing practice and proposals suffer from several flaws.  Profes-
sor Skeel explicitly notes the value of “continued experimentation” in 
this area.51  Along these lines, the next Part proposes a new plan, un-
secured debt compensation for managers, that addresses many of the 
flaws discussed in this Part while preserving the advantages of pay-for-
performance. 
50 For an analysis of the difficulties plaguing the valuation process in bankruptcy, 
see Kerry O’Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2005 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 403, 414-38. 
51 Skeel, supra note 4, at 949. 
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C.  Enron as an Example of the Deficiencies of Current  
Methods of CEO Compensation in Bankruptcy 
The Enron bankruptcy highlights many of the dangers of mana-
gerial compensation in bankruptcy described above.  Once Enron de-
clared bankruptcy, it hired a new manager, Stephen Cooper, head of 
the turnaround firms52 Kroll Zolfo Cooper, LLC and Stephen Forbes 
Cooper, LLC.53  Cooper was granted an annual salary of $1.32 million 
and his firm was guaranteed a bonus of at least $5 million if Enron 
avoided liquidation.54  The exact amount of the bonus was ultimately 
subject to the bankruptcy court’s approval at the conclusion of the 
case.55  Note the dangers inherent in these terms:  Cooper’s salary did 
nothing to enhance his incentives to maximize the value received by 
the firm’s creditors, and his bonus gave him an incentive to avoid liq-
uidation.  Obviously, if liquidation was the efficient option, then this 
incentive was inefficient, but even if liquidation was inefficient, Coo-
per’s incentives were still misplaced.  Once Cooper succeeded in 
avoiding liquidation, he had few direct incentives to take further steps 
to maximize the value of Enron’s assets. 
These deficiencies in managerial compensation undermined con-
fidence in the Enron bankruptcy.  Cooper directed Enron to hire 
many employees of his own primary employer, Kroll Zolfo Cooper.  By 
the end of the bankruptcy, Enron had paid Kroll Zolfo Cooper over  
$63 million in fees.56  As a principal in the turnaround firm, Cooper 
clearly benefited from the fees earned by Kroll Zolfo Cooper.  It is less 
clear, however, that these fees benefited Enron.  Cooper’s contract 
provided no disincentive to incur such fees.  So long as the fees 
helped avoid a liquidation and could be explained to the bankruptcy 
court as reasonable, Cooper had every incentive to hire his colleagues, 
even if these hires did not maximize Enron’s value.  Similarly, Cooper 
52 A “turnaround firm” is a firm that specializes in improving the fortunes of bank-
rupt or distressed companies. 
53 Floyd Norris & David Barboza, Lay Sold Shares for $100 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
16, 2002, at A1; U.S. Says It Found Problems in Enron Bankruptcy Billing, N.Y. TIMES, 
March 28, 2006, at C3.  Note that the purpose of this Section is not to suggest that Mr. 
Cooper behaved improperly, but rather that many of Enron’s bankruptcy expenditures 
may or may not have been efficient, and that the executive compensation structure did 
nothing to encourage efficient expenditures. 
54 Id. 
55 See Jonathan Stempel, Enron CEO’s Firm Seeks $25 Mln “Success Fee”, REUTERS, 
Sept. 3, 2004 (stating that Kroll Zolfo Cooper LLC “asked a bankruptcy judge for a . . . 
‘success fee,’” clearly implying that the fee was subject to court approval). 
56 Id. 
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had no reason to reduce the size of Enron’s legal bills.  High legal 
costs may have reduced the probability of liquidation and thereby en-
hanced Cooper’s expected bonus, even if the legal fees did not ulti-
mately raise the creditors’ return.  In light of these factors, the ques-
tions surrounding the Enron bankruptcy—with fees totaling 
approximately $1 billion, the “priciest on record”57—persist.  These 
fees may have created even more than $1 billion of value for Enron.  
The skewed incentives created by Cooper’s employment contract, 
however, ensure that suspicion about the fees will linger.58
The difficulty of providing performance incentives in bankruptcy 
is further exemplified by Kroll Zolfo Cooper’s request for bankruptcy 
court authorization of a $25 million “success fee” at the conclusion of 
Enron’s bankruptcy.59  In spite of the high fees billed to Enron by 
Kroll Zolfo Cooper employees, the firm claimed that it was entitled to 
the “success fee” because it had “produced extraordinary results for 
the bankruptcy estate.”60  Kroll Zolfo Cooper may well have been tell-
ing the truth.  The unclear criteria for granting pay-for-performance 
compensation in bankruptcy, however, prevented creditors and the 
bankruptcy court from having confidence that the success fee was a 
bona fide pay-for-performance measure rather than a windfall created 
by the fact that the head of Kroll Zolfo Cooper was also serving as the 
head of Enron.  Thus, whatever one thinks of Stephen Cooper’s per-
formance as Enron’s manager, his compensation contract clearly 
highlights the need for more effective pay-for-performance designs in 
bankruptcy. 
III.  DEBT COMPENSATION FOR MANAGERS 
A.  Unsecured Creditors and Chapter 11 Bankruptcies 
Before presenting the debt compensation proposal, it is crucial to 
establish some context for the proposal’s place within a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy.61  With limited exceptions,62 the Bankruptcy Code pro-
57 Eric Berger, Enron’s Legal Fees Priciest on Record, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2003, at 
1A. 
58 See id. (quoting many sources suggesting that Enron’s bankruptcy fees were un-
necessarily high). 
59 Stempel, supra note 55. 
60 Id. 
61 Most large insolvencies occur in Chapter 11.  See, e.g., Bris et al., supra note 18, 
at tbls.1 & 2 (showing more corporate bankruptcies proceeding within Chapter 11 
than Chapter 7 and presenting data to show that the assets of Chapter 11 companies 
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vides that all unsecured creditors enjoy similar rights in bankruptcy.  
The “adequate protection” clauses of §§ 363 and 364 subordinate un-
secured creditors to secured creditors.63  Notwithstanding the special 
treatment of secured creditors, several provisions of the Code require 
that similarly situated unsecured creditors receive similar treatment in 
any plan of reorganization or liquidation of a bankrupt company.64  In 
other words, similarly situated creditors share pro rata.65  The “fair 
and equitable” provisions, however, do not simply provide that all un-
secured creditors get the same return on their money.  Some unse-
cured creditors may be contractually senior to other unsecured credi-
tors.  If this is the case, then the “absolute priority rule” requires that 
the senior unsecured creditors receive full payment before the junior 
unsecured creditors receive any payments.66
When a company files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a committee 
(“the committee”) is formed to represent the interests of unsecured 
creditors in the bankruptcy.67  The Bankruptcy Code further stipulates 
that the committee consist of representatives from the seven largest 
unsecured creditors.68  Alternatively, the Code allows the committee 
to be composed of other willing creditors, so long as the creditors 
serving on the committee are “representative of the different kinds of 
are much greater than companies in Chapter 7).  Note, however, that committees may 
also be appointed in Chapter 7 liquidations.  See 11 U.S.C. § 705(a) (2000) (providing 
that unsecured creditors of a debtor in Chapter 7 may elect a creditors’ committee). 
62 A few narrow classes of unsecured claims enjoy priority over other unsecured 
creditors.  See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (establishing a hierarchy of claims). 
63 Id. §§ 363-364 (2000). 
64 See, e.g., id. § 1129(b)(1) (providing that a plan of reorganization should be 
confirmed “if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with 
respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not ac-
cepted, the plan”); see also id. § 1123(a)(4) (requiring a plan of reorganization to “pro-
vide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class”). 
65 Pro rata distribution means that all creditors in a given class get the same pro-
portion of the face value of their claims.  To illustrate, if one member of a class re-
ceives sixty cents for each dollar of debt, then all other members of the class should be 
reimbursed at the same ratio. 
66 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (requiring that a plan of reorganization—”[w]ith 
respect to a class of unsecured claims—(i) . . . provides that each [member of a class] 
receive or retain on account of such claim property of a value . . . equal to the allowed 
amount of such claim; or (ii) [claimants] junior to the claims of such class will not re-
ceive or retain under the plan . . . any property”). 
67 See id. §1102(a) (providing for the creation of a committee of creditors or equity 
security holders after a Chapter 11 order). 
68 See id. § 1102(b)(1) (“A committee of creditors . . . shall ordinarily consist of the 
persons . . . that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor . . . .”). 
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claims to be represented.”69  In practice, the committee is often cho-
sen to be representative of the interests of a diverse group of creditors.  
Unless the court finds that other committees are necessary because of 
conflicts of interests between unsecured creditors,70 the committee is 
well placed to represent the interests of unsecured creditors in a co-
herent fashion and to mediate conflicts between unsecured creditors. 
B.  Debt Compensation for Managers 
Part II detailed the difficulty of “incentivizing” managers in bank-
ruptcy.  To improve managerial performance, I propose that the 
committee be granted the right to award managers a percentage of 
the unsecured debt of the insolvent firm.71  This right to grant debt 
compensation can be created in one of two manners:  either by statute 
or through a compensation contract drafted by the debtor’s board of 
directors.  In either case, the compensation would be subject to the 
committee’s approval.72  As the bankrupt corporation’s board of di-
69 Id. 
70 See BAIRD, supra note 1, at 18.  In large bankruptcies, several committees may be 
formed to represent the interests of unsecured creditors with different contractual 
rights to the assets of the bankrupt company.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (“On request 
of a party in interest, the court may order the appointment of additional committees of 
creditors or of equity security holders if necessary to assure adequate representation of 
creditors or of equity security holders.  The United States trustee shall appoint any 
such committee.”).  Although a variety of factors are pertinent to this two-step evalua-
tion, courts tend to focus on (1) the presence of conflicted interests between the mov-
ing parties and the existing committee, (2) the costs associated with appointment, and 
(3) the stage of the case.  See In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(evaluating the adequacy of a committee by examining conflicting interests and the 
potential cost of creating additional committees, and listing “the nature of the case” as 
a factor to be evaluated); In re McLean Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 860-61 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (acknowledging that while the test for determining the adequacy of a 
committee’s representation is “necessarily vague,” two benchmarks include the pres-
ence of a potential conflict and cost). 
71 If there are multiple classes of secured creditors, then a compensation right can 
be granted to the junior secured creditors.  Although this Article focuses on Chapter 
11 bankruptcies, if a committee exists in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 705(a) 
(providing for creditors’ committees for Chapter 7 bankruptcies), then this committee 
should have the same powers as the unsecured creditors’ committee of a Chapter 11 
debtor. 
72 Because creditors are the typical residual claimants in bankruptcy, any compen-
sation contract chosen by the board of directors effectively spends the creditors’ 
money.  As a result, allowing the corporation’s board of directors to grant debt (a cost 
imposed on the creditors) is not as radical a departure as it may seem since the com-
pensation granted to the manager comes from the creditors in either case.  As shown 
below, debt compensation provides many advantages to the creditors that are unob-
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rectors may not zealously pursue the creditors’ best interests (despite 
the board’s fiduciary duties), the statutory route is preferable because 
it enables the committee to implement debt compensation without 
interference from the board. 
Under either mechanism, if the majority of the members of the 
committee approves a given percentage of debt compensation and the 
percentage meets a number of guidelines detailed later in this Arti-
cle,73 then the manager should receive the given percentage of all the 
noncontingent unsecured claims on the company.74  Upon confirma-
tion of a reorganization plan, the manager would receive the given 
percentage of whatever amount the original creditors receive in lieu 
of debt.  For example, if debt in the original company is transformed 
into equity in the reorganized company, then the manager would re-
ceive a percentage of equity, and if the unsecured debt is transformed 
into debt in the reorganized company, then the manager would re-
ceive a percentage of this debt claim.75  Every unsecured creditor 
would be bound by this decision of the committee.  To balance the 
committee’s right, equity claimants should also be allowed to grant 
the manager a percentage of their claims, but the percentage must be 
the same as that granted by the general unsecured creditors.  The 
committee’s right to grant debt compensation should not be absolute.  
Indeed, the court should have the right to veto the proposal if it feels 
that the proposal unduly jeopardizes the interests of other interested 
parties.  The risks of debt compensation and the appropriate re-
sponses to these risks will be covered in Part IV. 
Our example helps illustrate how the proposal would operate.  As-
sume for simplicity that the value of Firm is realized in cash upon liq-
uidation or reorganization at the moment Firm successfully concludes 
bankruptcy.76  Now suppose that Firm’s committee chooses (by major-
ity vote) to adopt the debt compensation scheme and award Manager 
tainable with ordinary compensation contracts.  Unsecured creditors may therefore 
prefer debt compensation to other forms of managerial compensation. 
73 See infra Part IV (discussing the potential responses to problems with a debt 
compensation plan). 
74 If a contingent claim subsequently becomes noncontingent (e.g., through a 
judgment in a lawsuit), then the manager should be awarded the agreed-upon per-
centage whenever the claim is no longer contingent. 
75 See infra Part IV.D (examining the consequences of allowing managers to hold 
debt claims in the reorganized company). 
76 In reality, Manager would receive the same securities that the original creditor 
received in exchange for its unsecured debt.  See infra Part IV.D (discussing this com-
plication in further detail). 
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3% of the unsecured debt of Firm.  Following this vote, every unse-
cured creditor must relinquish 3% of the face value of her debt to 
Manager.  If Creditor A owns debt with a face value of $1 million, then 
Manager would receive debt with a face value of $30,000 (3% of 
Creditor A’s $1 million).  Creditor A would then be left with unse-
cured debt with a face value of $970,000.  In total, Manager will get 
unsecured debt in Firm with a face value of $1.5 million (3% of Firm’s 
$50 million), where $50 million is the total face value of Firm’s unse-
cured debt (Assumption 1). 
Now suppose that the value of Firm in reorganization is $15 mil-
lion and that Manager receives no salary other than the percentage of 
the unsecured debt.  Efficiency dictates that Firm should be liqui-
dated, because its liquidation value of $20 million (Assumption 2) is 
greater than the reorganization value of $15 million.  In ordinary cir-
cumstances, however, Manager might be reluctant to liquidate rather 
than reorganize because, among other things, liquidation means 
Manager is out of a job.  For this example, assume that Manager val-
ues a future job with Firm at $100,000. 
Now compare Manager’s salary under the debt compensation 
scheme if Manager chooses to liquidate versus reorganize.  If Manager 
liquidates, Firm would realize $20 million.  The absolute priority rule 
provides that secured creditors, whose claims total $10 million, would 
be paid in full.  This means that $10 million would remain for unse-
cured creditors (equity would get nothing), who have claims with a 
face value of $50 million.  The “fair and equitable” principle provides 
that the unsecured creditors must share these proceeds pro rata.77  
Thus, each creditor would receive twenty cents for each dollar of face 
value (.20 = $10 million ÷ $50 million).  Manager’s portion of the debt 
would be valued at $1.5 million; thus, she would receive $300,000 in 
compensation ($300,000 = .20 × $1.5 million). 
On the other hand, if Manager chooses to reorganize, then Firm 
would realize only $15 million in value.  After paying the secured 
creditors, Firm would be left with $5 million for the unsecured claim-
ants, thus leaving each unsecured creditor with only ten cents on the 
dollar (.10 = $5 million ÷ $50 million).  Manager would receive 
$150,000 ($150,000 = .10 × $1.5 million).78
77 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (noting that the Bankruptcy Code 
requires a reorganization plan to be fair and equitable in order to be confirmed, 
which mandates pro rata distribution). 
78 Recall that Manager was granted debt with a face value of $1.5 million. 
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Thus, Manager’s compensation under reorganization is $150,000 
less than her return under liquidation.  Recall that Manager valued 
the prospect of a future job with Firm if Firm reorganized at $100,000.  
Accordingly, the self-interested Manager will make the efficient choice 
(liquidation) because, from her view, liquidation yields greater overall 
benefits than reorganization.  Without the debt compensation 
scheme, however, Manager would have made the inefficient choice 
(reorganization) because reorganization ensured Manager a job.  For 
example, if Manager received the same salary under liquidation or re-
organization, then Manager would choose reorganization, because it 
gives her a future job with a value of $100,000. 
By ensuring that Manager would choose the efficient option, the 
debt compensation scheme created value for unsecured creditors.  
For example, although Creditor A gave up 3% of her debt to Man-
ager, she benefited because she realized a greater return on the face 
value of her debt.  With liquidation, Creditor A’s debt would be worth 
$194,000 (.20 × $970,000 = $194,000).  Without debt compensation, 
by contrast, Manager would choose reorganization, leaving Creditor A 
with only $100,000 ($100,000 = .10 × $1 million).79  Thus, an unse-
cured creditor might have good (and efficient) reasons to relinquish 
some debt in order to improve Manager’s incentives. 
C.  Why Debt Compensation Is an Improvement upon Existing  
Means of Managerial Compensation in Bankruptcy 
In the preceding example, it was no coincidence that debt com-
pensation facilitated the efficient result.  Debt compensation aligns 
the incentives of managers with the incentives of the typical residual 
claimants in bankruptcy—the unsecured creditors.  As a result, debt 
compensation encourages a manager to pursue actions that are in her 
self-interest, while also improving the return of the unsecured credi-
tors.  Just as grants of stock options and restricted stock are believed to 
foster good behavior in managers of solvent firms, so too does unse-
cured debt compensation promote value-maximizing behavior in 
managers of bankrupt firms.  This alignment of a manager’s incen-
tives with those of bankruptcy’s typical residual claimants makes debt 
compensation an improvement upon other pay-for-performance plans 
and proposals. 
79 Note that this example understates the benefit of debt compensation versus sal-
ary for Manager because it assumes that, if debt compensation is not adopted, Man-
ager’s salary is zero—an obviously unrealistic assumption. 
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1.  Improvement over Pay-To-Stay Bonuses 
Just like pay-to-stay bonuses, debt compensation provides an in-
centive for managers to remain with an insolvent firm.  A manager 
who might receive a percentage of the unsecured debt in the firm en-
joys the prospect of a large payment upon the completion of bank-
ruptcy.  As a result, debt compensation should accomplish the goal of 
pay-to-stay bonuses—decreasing the incentive of managers to leave the 
“sinking ship.”80  Unlike pay-to-stay bonuses, debt compensation ac-
complishes additional goals as well.  By aligning incentives and en-
couraging the manager to stay with the firm, debt compensation of-
fers better performance per dollar of compensation value, making 
debt compensation clearly superior to simple pay-to-stay bonuses. 
2.  Improvement over Rapid-Reorganization Bonuses 
As discussed earlier, reorganization speed is only loosely corre-
lated with efficiency.81  As a result, rapid-reorganization bonuses may 
engender value-destroying incentives for managers.  Debt compensa-
tion, by contrast, correlates managerial compensation much more 
closely with value maximization.  Consequently, debt compensation 
better improves managerial performance. 
Recall our example in Part II.B.2, wherein Manager faced a deci-
sion to hire consultants to accelerate the reorganization process.  
Suppose that if Manager does not hire the consultants, Firm will be 
worth $30 million in reorganization.  If Manager hires the consultants, 
then Firm will be worth $35 million in reorganization (because of a 
faster reorganization), but Firm will incur $10 million in costs, for a 
net value of $25 million.  The unsecured creditors would prefer that 
Manager not hire the consultants because they cost more than they 
are worth.  If Manager is to receive a rapid-reorganization bonus, how-
ever, Manager will have an incentive to hire the consultants regardless 
of the effect on the unsecured creditors. 
Now assume that Manager receives debt compensation of 3% of 
the face value of the unsecured debt.  If Manager hires the consult-
ants, then (after paying the secured claimants in full) $15 million re-
80 See supra Part III.B (calculating the greater financial incentive a debt compensa-
tion plan gives Manager). 
81 See supra Part II.B.2 (evaluating a compensation plan that is tied to the speed of 
reorganization). 
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mains for unsecured creditors.82  Unsecured creditors then would re-
ceive thirty cents on the dollar (.30 = $15 million ÷ $50 million).  
Therefore, Manager’s $1.5 million in debt would be worth $450,000 
($450,000 = .30 × $1.5 million).  If, however, Manager chooses not to 
hire the consultants, then $20 million would remain for unsecured 
creditors in reorganization,83 meaning that they would receive forty 
cents on the dollar (.40 = $20 million ÷ $50 million).  Manager’s com-
pensation would then be worth $600,000 ($600,000 = .40 × $1.5 mil-
lion).  Given these incentives, Manager would make the efficient 
choice and not hire the consultants.  Thus, this example demonstrates 
how debt compensation improves upon rapid-reorganization bonuses 
by providing a closer alignment between managerial performance and 
managerial compensation. 
Note that debt compensation dictates the efficient outcome in the 
opposite case as well—if the consultants add value, then Manager would 
hire them.  Suppose that the consultants add $15 million in value to 
Firm for the cost of $10 million.  In this case, $25 million remains for 
unsecured creditors after secured creditors are satisfied, giving each 
unsecured creditor fifty cents on the dollar (.50 = $25 million ÷ $50 mil-
lion).  Manager’s debt then would be worth $750,000 ($750,000 = .50 
× $1.5 million).  Because $750,000 is greater than the $600,000 that 
Manager would receive if the consultants were not hired, Manager 
would hire the consultants, as efficiency dictates.  Debt compensation 
thereby ensures that consultants are hired when they add value and 
are not hired when they do not.  Rapid-reorganization bonuses, how-
ever, bias Manager in favor of hiring consultants even when the con-
sultants do not add value. 
3.  Improvement over Percentage-of-Assets Plans 
Percentage-of-assets plans help ensure that managers maximize 
value if liquidation is the clear choice.84  These plans, however, suffer 
from two flaws.  First, if liquidation is not the clear choice, then per-
centage-of-assets plans may skew incentives toward inefficient liquida-
82 Hiring the consultants makes the net value of Firm $25 million.  Secured credi-
tors are owed $10 million, leaving a residual value of $15 million for unsecured credi-
tors. 
83 Not hiring the consultants makes the value of Firm $30 million.  After paying 
the secured creditors in full, this leaves $20 million for unsecured creditors. 
84 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the benefits and limitations of percentage-of-
assets plans). 
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tion.  Second, these plans may be overly expensive.  Debt compensa-
tion, by contrast, provides incentives for managers to make the effi-
cient choice between liquidation and reorganization in all contexts.  
Debt compensation also provides higher-powered incentives than per-
centage-of-assets plans, making it the less expensive of the two op-
tions.85
Recall the example presented in Part II.B.3.a.  Firm is worth $15 
million in reorganization and $10 million in liquidation.  If Manager 
gets 3% of assets in liquidation and an $80,000 salary upon reorgani-
zation, then Manager will choose liquidation, in spite of the fact that 
reorganization is the efficient choice.  Consider the same scenario 
when Manager receives 3% of unsecured debt.  If Manager chooses 
liquidation, all of Firm’s $10 million of value goes to pay secured 
creditors, leaving unsecured creditors with nothing.  Manager, whose 
debt is unsecured, would receive nothing.  If Manager chooses reor-
ganization, however, then $5 million would be left over after the se-
cured creditors are compensated.  Manager’s $1.5 million of debt 
compensation is therefore worth $150,000 ($150,000 = $1.5 million × 
($5 million ÷ $50 million)).  Thus, Manager is encouraged to choose 
reorganization—the efficient choice, because her incentives are 
closely aligned with the interests of the residual claimants. 
Debt compensation may also provide higher-powered and less ex-
pensive incentives than percentage-of-assets plans.  Returning to the 
example in Part II.B.3.b, suppose that liquidation is the best option 
for Firm.  With good managerial performance, the liquidation value 
of Firm would be $12 million; with bad performance, the liquidation 
value would be $10 million.  Now suppose Manager is awarded 3% of 
assets.  If Manager performs well, she would receive $360,000 (.03 × 
$12 million = $360,000), but if Manager performs poorly, she would 
receive only $300,000 (.03 × $10 million = $300,000).  Under these as-
sumptions, the percentage-of-assets plan provides Manager with ap-
propriate incentives.  Because Manager shares the increase in value 
with creditors, Manager will self-interestedly attempt to garner the 
higher liquidation value for Firm. 
This same incentive is also assured by the percentage-of-assets 
plan, but to a lesser degree.  The difference in compensation between 
the good and the bad performance states ($60,000) is a small per-
85 Although debt compensation plans are less expensive than percentage-of-assets 
plans, cost remains an important obstacle to the use of debt compensation.  See infra 
Part IV.A. 
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centage of the total guaranteed compensation of $300,000.  The per-
centage-of-assets plan may therefore be called “low powered” in the 
sense that it requires a considerable total expenditure of money to 
create sufficient incentives for the appropriate managerial behavior;86 
over $300,000 must be spent to generate $60,000 in incentives. 
Contrast this with the outcome using debt compensation.  Sup-
pose that the unsecured creditors grant Manager 3% of unsecured 
debt.  If Manager performs poorly, then Firm would be worth $10 mil-
lion.  This amount only suffices to compensate the secured creditors; 
the unsecured creditors would receive nothing.  As a result, Manager’s 
3% stake in unsecured debt has no value.  If Manager performs well, 
by contrast, then Firm would be worth $12 million.  After paying the 
secured creditors, unsecured creditors are left with $2 million, mean-
ing they would get four cents per dollar of debt (.04 = $2 million ÷ 
$50 million).  Manager’s $1.5 million in face value is therefore worth 
$60,000 ($60,000 = .04 × $1.5 million). 
Debt compensation gives Manager the same incentive to attain the 
good result (an additional $60,000) as the percentage-of-assets plan, 
but at a much cheaper cost.  Whereas the percentage-of-assets plan 
would grant Manager at least $300,000 in any scenario, debt compen-
sation only rewards good performance.  Debt compensation therefore 
offers higher-powered incentives than percentage-of-assets plans.87
This more preferable incentive structure is achieved by not offer-
ing Manager a percentage of the secured debt.  This makes good 
sense; secured creditors should not compensate Manager, because 
they do not depend on her performance in order to receive payment.  
As a result, granting Manager a percentage of Firm that is reserved for 
secured creditors is wasteful.88  The debt compensation approach 
avoids this problem by granting Manager a percentage of unsecured 
debt exclusively. 
86 See supra note 45 for a definition of low-powered incentives. 
87 In reality, of course, Manager will always receive some compensation.  The pur-
pose of the example is to show that debt compensation creates tailored incentives that 
are superior to the blunt approach of the percentage-of-assets scheme. 
88 In the typical bankruptcy, secured creditors get paid in full.  See Bris et al., supra 
note 18, at tbl.8 (indicating that the average secured creditor is paid in full).  Thus, the 
example is realistic in suggesting that secured creditors get paid in full in every eventu-
ality.  When secured creditors will not be paid in full (for example, if there are junior 
secured creditors), the junior secured creditors should participate in the debt com-
pensation plan. 
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Debt compensation therefore ameliorates two of the primary flaws 
of the percentage-of-assets plan:  it does not skew incentives to liqui-
date, nor does it cost as much. 
4.  Improvement over Equity Compensation Plans 
As explained in Part II.B.4, equity compensation plans suffer from 
a number of defects.  Two prominent defects are skewed incentives to 
create an efficient capital structure and skewed incentives to provide 
accurate valuations of debt as opposed to equity.  Debt compensation 
mitigates or eliminates both of these defects. 
Debt compensation gives managers incentives to shape an effi-
cient capital structure for reorganized firms.  To illustrate, return to 
the example presented in Part II.B.4.a.  In this version of the example, 
a debt-equity ratio of 1 to 1 adds value to the reorganized Firm by 
mitigating agency problems.89  Firm is worth $40 million with this 
debt-equity ratio, but only $30 million when the Firm has an all-equity 
structure.  If Manager receives equity compensation, she has incen-
tives to fashion a less efficient all-equity capital structure because the 
greater the value of equity, the greater Manager’s return. 
With debt compensation, by contrast, Manager would choose the 
appropriate capital structure.  Assume that Manager receives 3% of 
unsecured debt.  If Manager chooses the all-equity capital structure, 
then $20 million would remain for unsecured creditors after secured 
creditors are satisfied.  Manager’s $1.5 million face-value debt would 
therefore be worth $600,000 ($600,000 = $1.5 million × ($20 million ÷ 
$50 million)).  If Manager chooses the more balanced capital struc-
ture, by contrast, then $30 million would remain for unsecured credi-
tors, meaning that Manager would receive $900,000 ($900,000 = $1.5 
million × ($30 million ÷ $50 million)).  Thus, Manager will choose the 
efficient capital structure when receiving debt compensation.  Be-
cause reorganization of the capital structure is one of Manager’s es-
sential roles in bankruptcy, this feature of debt compensation consti-
tutes a significant advantage over equity compensation plans. 
With debt compensation, Manager also will have no incentive to 
overvalue debt with respect to equity.  If Manager produced an overes-
timate of the value of debt in the reorganized Firm relative to equity, 
then Manager’s equity compensation would be underestimated.  
89 For an explanation of how debt’s presence in capital structure can add value, 
see supra note 48. 
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While Manager may prefer this combination when receiving equity 
compensation because it understates the value of her compensation, 
she has no such incentive with debt compensation.  So long as Man-
ager provides a reasonably accurate description of the total value of 
the company, her total compensation will appear the same regardless 
of whether she exaggerates the value of one class of securities with re-
spect to another.  As a result, Manager has no incentive to misestimate 
the values of different securities.  With greater confidence in Man-
ager’s valuations, creditors can place more reliance on these estimates 
when choosing whether to vote for a plan of reorganization.  Courts 
will also benefit from greater confidence in Manager’s estimations 
when deciding whether to confirm or to reject a plan of reorganiza-
tion.90
This Section has examined the superiority of debt compensation 
with respect to many alternative forms of managerial compensation in 
bankruptcy.  Unlike these other compensation structures, debt com-
pensation provides incentives for efficient managerial actions without 
creating incentives to distort the process of reorganization.  As such, 
debt compensation presents an important new tool for improving 
managerial performance in bankruptcy. 
5.  Improvement of the Functioning of the Creditors’ Committee 
At present, creditor participation on the creditors’ committee suf-
fers from free-rider problems.91  All of the creditors share the benefits 
of the increase in value created by the committee’s monitoring of the 
debtor.  Only the creditors on the committee bear the costs of moni-
toring, however.  The other creditors free ride on the committee’s ef-
forts.92  As a result, creditors are reluctant to join the creditors’ com-
90 A plan of reorganization must meet several criteria in order to receive court ap-
proval.  Whether or not a plan meets the criteria will depend critically on valuations of 
different securities.  For example, it is impossible to know if a plan meets the “best in-
terests of the creditors” test without evaluating the disbursements to claimants.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2000) (describing what is commonly called the “best interests of 
the creditors” test and requiring that a reorganization plan provide creditors with no 
less than they would have received in liquidation). 
91 J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 271 (1991) 
(“It is not surprising . . . why unsecured creditors are hesitant to become members of a 
creditors’ committee.  It is clearly to the advantage of an unsecured creditor to adopt a 
‘free-rider’ strategy . . . and hope that some other unsecured creditor will . . . bear the 
cost of serving on the committee.”). 
92 See BAIRD, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that the committee is “not compensated 
for [its] efforts” and “[m]oreover, as a member of the committee, a creditor is charged 
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mittee or, if they do join, to monitor the debtor efficiently.  The free-
rider problem therefore undermines the effectiveness of the creditors’ 
committee in protecting the creditors’ interests. 
Debt compensation mitigates this problem in a number of ways.  
By aligning the incentives of managers with those of creditors, debt 
compensation reduces the need for monitoring.  With debt compen-
sation, managers self-interestedly pursue actions that benefit the 
creditors, decreasing the importance of effective creditor monitoring.  
The salience of the free-rider problem is thereby reduced. 
Debt compensation also raises the incentive for creditors to join 
the creditors’ committee.  Debt compensation confers an important 
new power on the members of the committee—the ability to influence 
the use or non-use of debt compensation.  This power would be par-
ticularly important to the largest creditors, who have the most to gain 
or lose through debt compensation.  Consequently, debt compensa-
tion raises the incentive for these creditors to join the committee by 
adding to the advantages of committee service. 
By encouraging large creditors to join the creditors’ committee, 
debt compensation enhances the ability of that committee to oversee 
the manager.  Large creditors are often the most sophisticated parties 
with the best ability to monitor.  In addition, large creditors are less 
likely to free ride.  If one creditor holds half the debt of a bankrupt 
company, then that creditor enjoys half the gains of its monitoring ef-
forts while bearing all the costs of these efforts.  While even this credi-
tor will monitor less than optimally because of mismatched incentives, 
the large creditor’s monitoring efforts should be greater than those of 
a small creditor.  A small creditor garners a much smaller proportion 
of the gains of monitoring than the large creditor, while continuing to 
bear the full cost of the monitoring efforts.  By raising the incentive 
for creditors with superior monitoring ability to join the creditors’ 
committee, debt compensation improves the ability of the committee 
to monitor the debtor. 
By improving managerial incentives and the functioning of the 
creditors’ committee, debt compensation constitutes an important ad-
vance in managerial compensation in bankruptcy.  It is not without 
(surmountable) complications, however, as the next Part demonstrates. 
with looking out not only for its own interests but also for those of the other general 
creditors”). 
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IV.  WEAKNESSES OF DEBT COMPENSATION AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES 
Although debt compensation for managers in bankruptcy offers 
many advantages over other compensation structures, it is no panacea.  
Several potential flaws and complications may obstruct debt compen-
sation’s efficacy.  These flaws include debt compensation’s expense, 
the creation of managerial biases in favor of some groups of creditors 
with respect to others, and the difficulty of unwinding the debt com-
pensation structure once a firm has reorganized.  While none of these 
complications is insoluble, judges and lawmakers must shape the debt 
compensation approach to ensure that the benefits described above 
are realized.  This Part examines the potential shortcomings of debt 
compensation and discusses means of mitigating these weaknesses. 
A.  Debt Compensation’s Expense 
High expense may plague the debt compensation approach.  As 
discussed with respect to the percentage-of-assets plan,93 percentage 
compensation provides low-powered incentives—improved perform-
ance only raises a manager’s pay by a small percentage of the total 
compensation.94  Moreover, debt compensation bears some resem-
blance to stock options and other executive compensation plans that 
have recently fallen into ill repute for granting managers large wind-
falls without improving performance.95  If debt compensation im-
proves performance by a little but costs a lot, then it may not be worth 
the trouble. 
High expense should not obstruct debt compensation for two rea-
sons.  First, as noted above, debt compensation does not simply award 
the manager a percentage of the entire firm.  Because secured debt is 
likely to be repaid in any event, managerial incentives are not im-
proved by awarding the manager a percentage of secured debt.  In re-
sponse, debt compensation excludes secured debt.  By focusing the 
93 See supra Part II.B.3.b. 
94 For a discussion of low-powered incentives, see Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. 
Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-
June 1990, at 138, 140. 
95 For a comprehensive discussion of the failure of pay-for-performance incentives, 
see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 6-7; Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Per-
formance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 261-62 (1990).  But see 
Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. 
ECON. 653, 654-55 (1998) (finding that CEO compensation is strongly related to firm 
performance and attributing this relationship to stock option grants). 
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incentive compensation on the typical residual claimant—the unse-
cured creditor96—debt compensation facilitates higher-powered in-
centive compensation.  Second, debt compensation is voluntary; 
creditors’ committees can choose not to employ the plan if it is be-
lieved to be too expensive. 
1.  Opt-out for Senior Unsecured Creditors 
Excluding secured creditors from debt compensation improves 
the “power” of debt compensation and ensures that secured creditors 
will not be forced to pay for compensation that does not yield them 
considerable benefits.  Debt compensation may still be low powered, 
however, if secured debt is small relative to unsecured debt.  If a bank-
rupt firm’s entire debt load is unsecured, for example, then the se-
cured debt exception does not foster higher-powered incentives.  As a 
result, debt compensation may prove to be low powered and to cost 
more than it is worth under some circumstances. 
Allowing some senior classes of unsecured creditors to opt out of 
debt compensation would heighten the impact of each debt compen-
sation dollar on managerial performance.  As discussed above, all un-
secured creditors are not alike.  Some debt contracts give some unse-
cured creditors priority with respect to other unsecured creditors.  
The Bankruptcy Code recognizes this eventuality by providing for the 
establishment of additional creditors’ committees when “necessary to 
assure adequate representation of creditors.”97
Senior unsecured creditors should be allowed to “opt out” (as a 
group) of the debt compensation package.  To illustrate this, modify 
Assumption 1 of our example from Part I so that there are no secured 
creditors of Firm.  Instead, suppose that senior unsecured creditors 
hold $15 million in face value-debt, while general unsecured creditors 
are owed $35 million.  Assume that a senior unsecured creditors’ 
committee has been appointed to protect the interests of the senior 
lenders.  Suppose also that Firm will be worth $20 million or $25 mil-
lion, depending on Manager’s performance.  Finally, assume that the 
unsecured creditors’ committee, representing ordinary unsecured 
creditors, grants 3% of debt to Manager. 
96 See Bris et al., supra note 18, at tbl.8 (finding that although debts to secured 
creditors are typically satisfied, debts to unsecured creditors often are not). 
97 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2000). 
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If the unsecured creditors’ committee’s decision binds all unse-
cured creditors, then Manager would receive $1.5 million ($1.5 mil-
lion = .03 × $50 million) of face value of unsecured debt.  Senior un-
secured debt would make up $450,000 ($450,000 = .03 × $15 million) 
of this face value, while $1.05 million ($1.05 million = .03 × $35 mil-
lion) of this debt would be general unsecured debt.  If Firm is worth 
$20 million, then the absolute priority rule provides that the senior 
unsecured creditors would get paid in full while the general unse-
cured creditors would receive the $5 million that remains after the 
senior unsecured creditors are fully compensated.  In this case, Man-
ager’s senior unsecured debt would be worth $450,000 while her gen-
eral unsecured debt would be worth $150,000 ($150,000 = $1.05 mil-
lion × ($5 million ÷ $35 million)), for a total compensation of 
$600,000.  If Firm is worth $25 million, then Manager’s senior unse-
cured claims would be worth $450,000 while her general unsecured 
debt would be worth $300,000 ($300,000 = $1.05 million × ($10 mil-
lion ÷ $35 million)), for a total of $750,000.  Thus, Manager’s salary 
would increase by 25% (.25 = ($750,000 - $600,000) ÷ $600,000) with 
good performance. 
If senior unsecured creditors are allowed to opt out of debt com-
pensation and form a senior unsecured creditors’ committee (a likely 
outcome when senior unsecured creditors constitute a large group of 
creditors),98 then this committee should vote on whether or not to 
participate in the debt compensation plan by awarding the manager 
the same percentage of senior debt chosen by the official unsecured 
creditors’ committee.  When there is no senior creditors’ committee, 
senior creditors should vote to opt in or opt out of the debt compen-
sation.  If a majority (by value)99 of a given class of senior creditors 
votes to opt out of debt compensation, then the manager would re-
ceive no senior debt.  But if a majority votes to opt in, then the man-
98 Some courts have stated that the “chief concern [in deciding whether or not to 
appoint an additional committee] . . . is whether it appears that different classes of 
debt and equity holders may be treated differently under [the] plan and need repre-
sentation through appointment of additional committees.”  In re Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Group, Inc., 118 B.R. 209, 212 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).  Conflicts between sen-
ior creditors and other creditors are extremely common when there is a large group of 
senior unsecured creditors.  In these circumstances, it is quite likely that a committee 
will be appointed to represent senior unsecured creditors. 
99 Alternatively, opting out of a debt compensation plan may require a two-thirds 
majority by value and a simple majority by number of senior unsecured creditors.  This 
two-thirds in value, one-half in number rule is the standard used for confirmation of a 
plan of reorganization by an impaired class of creditors. 
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ager would receive a percentage of all the senior debt (including the 
debt of those who vote against the proposal).100
In our example, senior unsecured creditors would vote to opt out 
of debt compensation.  No matter how Manager performs, Firm 
would be worth more than $15 million, meaning that the senior credi-
tors would be paid in full under any eventuality.  As a result, senior 
creditors would refuse to relinquish any of their debt as compensation 
to Manager.  The opt-out by senior creditors renders debt compensa-
tion a more effective and less expensive means of compensation.  
When senior creditors opt out, Manager would receive $1.05 million 
in face value of general unsecured debt, which is 3% of the total gen-
eral unsecured debt.  This means that if Manager performs poorly, 
she would earn $150,000 ($150,000 = $1.05 million × ($5 million ÷ 
$35 million)); if she performs well, she would receive $300,000 
($300,000 = $1.05 million × ($10 million ÷ $35 million)). 
The absolute size of the incentive for Manager to perform well (an 
extra $150,000) is thus the same whether or not senior creditors 
choose to opt out.  When senior creditors opt out, however, the total 
cost of managerial compensation goes down by $450,000 because sen-
ior creditors are not forced to turn over debt to Manager.  Thus, al-
lowing senior creditors to opt out reduces the potentially high costs of 
debt compensation while retaining the same positive impact of mana-
gerial incentives. 
2.  Debt Compensation Is a Voluntary Plan 
The strongest defense against debt compensation’s high expense 
is that it is voluntary—creditors’ committees can choose whether or 
not to employ the plan.  If debt compensation is not worth the ex-
pense, the committee is free to reject it.  If creditors believe that debt 
compensation is worth the cost, however, then the law should facili-
tate its use.  Just as shareholders of corporations are free to grant eq-
uity to managers to improve managerial compensation, so too should 
creditors be allowed to arrange similar pay-for-performance plans in 
bankruptcy. 
Many commentators criticize non-bankruptcy pay-for-performance 
plans for promising more than they deliver.  If a manager effectively 
controls a board, for example, then the manager may be able to gar-
100 For a discussion of why a majority vote should be binding on all creditors, see 
infra Part IV.B.1. 
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ner outsize compensation that is labeled “pay-for-performance,” but is 
actually a large handout that provides few positive incentives to the 
manager.101  “Pay-for-performance” underperforms ordinary compen-
sation in these circumstances. 
While these flaws caution against slavish reliance on pay-for-
performance, they are unlikely to be as salient with regard to debt 
compensation in bankruptcy.  A manager is unlikely to enjoy the same 
control over a creditors’ committee that she sometimes enjoys over a 
board of directors.102  As commanded by statute, creditors’ committees 
must be composed of large or representative creditors.103  A manager 
cannot nominate candidates, nor does she have a seat on the commit-
tee.  As a result, a manager cannot dominate a creditors’ committee in 
the same way that she might dominate a board of directors.  Debt 
compensation for managers in bankruptcy is therefore more likely to 
reflect sound business decision making by the creditors’ committee 
than rent-seeking behavior by the manager. 
In spite of debt compensation’s voluntariness, courts should re-
main vigilant for abuses.  If a court feels that debt compensation re-
sults from managerial domination of the creditors’ committee rather 
than business fundamentals, the court should reject the debt compen-
sation plan.104  By requiring the approval of a third party to grant debt 
compensation, the worst managerial compensation abuses should be 
avoided. 
B.  Conflicts Between Creditors Caused by Debt Compensation 
Some creditors may be harmed by debt compensation.  If the plan 
causes managers to favor one group of creditors over another, then its 
benefits may be outweighed by its costs.  While fears of inefficient be-
havior by debt-compensated managers may be overstated by some 
101 Scholars have suggested that “pay-for-performance” plans often fail to achieve 
their purpose.  See supra note 95 (citing sources debating the effectiveness of pay-for-
performance). 
102 For examples of the way managers can sometimes dominate the boards of di-
rectors of companies outside of bankruptcy, see Michael J. Wolf, Op-Ed., Media Mutiny, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at A14. 
103 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (2000). 
104 Although such determinations are typically difficult for courts to make, the de-
tailed involvement of the court with the affairs of a bankrupt company means that the 
court will have some basis on which to make the determination.  Moreover, the court 
will have other reasons, described infra Part IV.F, to reject debt compensation plans 
that may result in very large payoffs to managers. 
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groups of creditors, there will occasionally be some merit to these 
claims.  To prevent debt compensation from causing inefficient 
managerial behavior, courts should follow some of the guidelines pre-
sented here before approving a debt compensation plan. 
As a general matter, it should be emphasized that the fact that 
some groups of creditors are harmed by debt compensation is not rea-
son to doubt its usefulness.  Bankruptcy procedures strive to obtain 
the greatest value from the bankrupt firm, not to satisfy any particular 
group of creditors.105  If debt compensation maximizes value, even 
while harming one group of creditors, then it adds value and should 
still be encouraged. 
1.  Conflicts Among General Unsecured Creditors 
Although it is unlikely that all general unsecured creditors will be 
happy with the decision to grant debt compensation, they must all be 
bound by the decision of the creditors’ committee.  Binding all credi-
tors prevents free riding by some.  If some general unsecured credi-
tors were allowed to opt out of granting debt compensation, they 
would gain the performance-enhancing benefits of debt compensa-
tion without having to pay for them.  This potential for free riding 
may convince many creditors to vote against an efficient debt com-
pensation plan.  To prevent this eventuality, a debt compensation 
award must be binding on all general unsecured creditors. 
Making the decision of the creditors’ committee binding upon all 
general unsecured creditors is not a radical idea.  Shareholders of a 
company outside of bankruptcy cannot opt out of stock option plans.  
Instead, the shareholders are bound by the decision of the board of 
directors.  Similarly, general unsecured creditors should be bound by 
the decisions of the unsecured creditors’ committee.106
105 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 231-32 (4th ed. 2006) 
(describing bankruptcy as an attempt to “make the best of a bad situation” and sug-
gesting that the absolute priority rule is not a critical consideration for today’s large 
bankruptcies). 
106 At times, the creditors’ committee may also require the debtor to take certain 
actions.  See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel 
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 580 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding 
that a creditors’ committee could sue the company to force it to avoid fraudulent 
transfers). 
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2.  Conflicts Between Secured Creditors and Unsecured Creditors 
Debt compensation runs against the interests of secured creditors.  
Because a manager’s interests are aligned with those of the unsecured 
creditors, the manager may favor unsecured creditors over secured 
creditors. 
In some circumstances, a manager’s tendency to favor unsecured 
creditors may lead to inefficient outcomes.  Returning to the example 
from Part I, modify Assumption 3 to make reorganization a riskier 
process.  If Firm pursues a reorganization, there is a 60% chance that 
Firm will be worth $30 million and a 40% chance that Firm will be 
worthless ($0).  Under this assumption, efficiency dictates that Firm 
should liquidate because its liquidation value of $20 million (Assump-
tion 2) is greater than its expected reorganization value of $18 million 
($18 million = (.60 × $30 million) + (.40 × $0)). 
Debt compensation will not lead to the efficient outcome under 
these conditions.  Under liquidation, $10 million remains for unse-
cured creditors after compensating secured creditors.  Under at-
tempted reorganization, by contrast, unsecured creditors get an aver-
age receipt of $12 million ($12 million = .60 × ($30 million - $10 
million) + (.40 × $0)).  When Manager receives debt compensation, 
her percentage of unsecured debt will be worth more (on average) 
under reorganization than under liquidation.  Thus, Manager will 
choose reorganization, in spite of the fact that liquidation is the effi-
cient choice. 
This flaw in debt compensation is not as problematic as it might 
seem.  First, in many cases, the secured creditors are comfortably over-
secured.107  As a result, this scenario should not occur too frequently.  
Second, the Bankruptcy Code includes many protections for secured 
creditors.  For example, a debtor may not use an asset that provides 
security for a creditor without providing that creditor “adequate pro-
tection” for that asset.108  Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code explains 
that adequate protection means that the secured creditor should not 
107 An over-secured creditor’s security interest is worth more than the underlying 
loan made by the creditor.  In this event, the over-secured creditor’s interest in the col-
lateral is limited to the value of the claim.  11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)(1) (West Supp. 2006). 
108 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2000) (granting a secured creditor relief from the 
automatic stay if the debtor does not provide adequate protection for the asset).  Once 
a secured creditor is granted relief from the stay, that creditor can prevent the debtor 
from using the asset that acts as security (e.g., by foreclosing on the asset).  See BAIRD, 
supra note 1, at 177 (explaining that a secured creditor granted relief from the stay can 
seize its collateral). 
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suffer a loss in value because the debtor continued to use the secured 
asset in bankruptcy.109  If pursuing a plan of reorganization risks the 
loss of the secured creditor’s security, the secured creditor can there-
fore request relief from the automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Thus, it is not likely that the bankruptcy court will approve ac-
tions, like the one described above, that place the secured creditors of 
a firm in jeopardy of losing their security.  The secured creditor pro-
tections offered by the Code thus mitigate the chance that debt com-
pensation will unduly harm secured creditors.  As a practical matter, 
these protections appear to work effectively.  Recall that secured 
creditors are paid at least 95% of each claim in more than three-
quarters of all Chapter 11 bankruptcies, suggesting that debt compen-
sation should not unduly harm them.110
In addition, most managers will not receive debt compensation 
exclusively.  Instead, they will be compensated by a combination of 
salary and debt.  The salary constitutes a priority administrative ex-
pense.111  If the “adequate protection” offered to secured creditors 
proves insufficient, then the remaining funds owed to the secured 
creditors have priority over managers’ salaries.112  As a result, manag-
ers will experience some loss of compensation if secured creditors are 
not compensated in full.  This provides added protection for secured 
creditors.  In the example presented above, Manager would not re-
ceive any salary if she attempted reorganization and Firm had no 
value.  This would make Manager more reluctant to choose an ineffi-
cient reorganization over a more efficient liquidation. 
If unsecured creditors feel that they have little to lose (if they are 
out of the money, for example), then they may be willing to grant the 
manager a very high percentage debt compensation.  A very high per-
centage might encourage inefficient managerial choices.  Returning 
to our example, modify Assumption 2 to make the value of Firm in 
liquidation $10.4 million rather than $20 million.  In addition, modify 
Assumption 3 to make the value of Firm if it pursues reorganization 
$30 million with a 10% probability and $0 with a 90% probability.  As-
sume also that Manager receives $400,000 in salary in addition to any 
debt compensation.  Note that under these circumstances, unsecured 
109 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2000). 
110 Bris et al., supra note 18, at tbl.8. 
111 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2006). 
112 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000). 
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creditors receive nothing if Firm liquidates—the liquidation value 
equals the value of secured claims and Manager’s salary.113
Under these circumstances, liquidation is clearly the efficient out-
come.114  If Manager receives debt compensation of 3%, then she 
would choose liquidation.  Manager’s desire to preserve her $400,000 
salary exceeds her incentive to maximize the value of unsecured debt.  
The unsecured creditors (who receive nothing under liquidation), 
however, have nothing to lose by granting Manager much higher lev-
els of debt compensation to encourage her to attempt an inefficient 
reorganization.  Suppose that the unsecured creditors grant Manager 
50% of the face value of unsecured debt.  In this case, Manager would 
choose reorganization because her pecuniary incentive to maximize 
the value of her debt compensation exceeds her salary.115  In spite of 
the high debt compensation award, unsecured creditors would gain as 
well; by encouraging Manager to choose reorganization, the high debt 
compensation award opens the possibility that unsecured creditors 
will receive some compensation.  Had unsecured creditors not 
granted such a high percentage, Manager would have chosen liquida-
tion, and then the unsecured creditors would be left with nothing.  
Thus, in some scenarios, debt compensation can lead to an inefficient 
outcome despite the presence of managerial salary. 
To protect against this outcome, courts should take a number of 
precautions.  First, they should be especially vigilant in protecting se-
cured creditors’ rights when managers receive debt compensation.  
Second, and more importantly, courts should reject debt compensa-
tion plans that award overly high percentages to managers.116  To de-
termine when a percentage is overly high, courts should compare the 
113 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (West Supp. 2006) (providing that administrative ex-
penses such as salaries receive priority over ordinary unsecured claims).  Thus, Man-
ager’s salary must be paid in full before unsecured claimants receive any compensa-
tion. 
114 Liquidation realizes $10.4 million.  Reorganization yields an expected value of 
$3 million ($3 million = (.10 × $30 million) + (.90 × $0)). 
115 If Firm liquidates, Manager receives $400,000.  If Firm reorganizes, Manager 
receives an expected value of approximately $1 million (.10 ($400,000 + .05 ($30 mil-
lion - $10.4 million)) + (.90 × $0) ≈ $1 million).   
116 To give committees and managers an incentive to choose reasonable percent-
ages, a rule might be adopted that only one debt compensation plan can be put for-
ward to the court.  If the court rejects the debt compensation plan, then debt compen-
sation cannot be used with respect to the manager in question.  This would prevent the 
committee from “pushing the envelope” with its debt compensation proposal, secure 
in the knowledge that if one plan were rejected, the committee could subsequently 
modify the plan to ensure court acceptance. 
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percentage of debt received by the debt-compensated manager with 
the percentage of equity (in the form of stock grants and stock op-
tions) granted to managers of similar firms outside of bankruptcy.  If 
the manager’s debt compensation percentage is considerably higher 
than those of her peers outside of bankruptcy, then the court should 
reject the debt compensation plan because there is a high risk that the 
plan will create inefficient incentives. 
The conflict between secured creditors and unsecured creditors in 
bankruptcy shares a number of similarities with the conflict between 
debt claimants and equity claimants in an ordinary company.117  In 
these companies, managers are commonly granted stock and stock 
options, in spite of the fact that such compensation introduces con-
flicts between creditors’ interests and managers’ interests.  Just as in-
centive compensation is permitted in these contexts, so too should it 
be permitted within bankruptcy.118
Nevertheless, the threats caused by incentive compensation to the 
interests of senior creditors are real.  Outside of bankruptcy, these 
creditors receive protections against managerial misbehavior, such as 
a change in managerial fiduciary duties as companies reach the zone 
of insolvency.119  Within bankruptcy, courts should provide the protec-
tions described here. 
3.  Conflicts Between Senior Unsecured Creditors  
and General Unsecured Creditors 
Because senior unsecured creditors may want to provide strong 
incentives to managers, the availability of debt compensation will of-
ten be a positive development for this set of creditors.  When senior 
unsecured creditors do not need to provide such incentives, the opt-
out mechanism described in Part IV.A.1 reduces the cost of debt 
compensation.  Even with the opt-out mechanism, however, senior 
unsecured creditors will occasionally be harmed by debt compensa-
tion. 
117 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1506 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (illustrating a situation where bondholders sought relief from an ac-
tion by shareholders that harmed the value of the bonds). 
118 For an analysis of the “asset substitution” conflict between debt and equity, 
which is analogous to the conflict described here, see Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and 
Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 473-75 (1992). 
119 See supra note 15 (presenting cases discussing the fiduciary duties to creditors). 
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The conflicts between senior unsecured creditors and ordinary 
unsecured creditors parallel those between secured creditors and un-
secured creditors.  Unsecured creditors who are “out of the money” 
may grant secured creditors an extremely high percentage of their 
debt to encourage them to take large risks.  If the risks pay off, the un-
secured creditors reap much of the benefits.  If the risks fail to pay off, 
however, then the senior unsecured creditors bear much of the cost.  
As explained above, unsecured creditors may be best off awarding an 
extremely large percentage in these circumstances.  Moreover, senior 
unsecured creditors do not enjoy some of the protections offered by 
the Bankruptcy Code to secured creditors. 
Because of these concerns, courts should refuse to approve a debt 
compensation plan that has been rejected by the senior unsecured 
creditors when (1) there is a large amount of senior unsecured debt 
relative to total unsecured debt—making it more likely that senior un-
secured creditors, and not general unsecured creditors, are the resid-
ual claimants of the firm; and (2) the debt compensation amounts 
awarded to managers by the unsecured creditors’ committee are ex-
cessively large.  These conditions indicate a heightened probability 
that debt compensation is being used to encourage inefficient risk tak-
ing rather than value maximization.  When these conditions are not 
present, courts should approve debt compensation plans because they 
are likely to be efficient. 
4.  Conflicts Between Equity and Unsecured Creditors 
Debt compensation may harm the interests of equity claimants in 
bankruptcy.  Because debt compensation aligns the interests of man-
agers with those of unsecured creditors, managers may favor these 
creditors’ interests over those of equity claimants.120  If equity holders 
are the true residual claimants of a firm, then the manager’s incen-
tives to improve the value of unsecured debt may be inefficient. 
These concerns should not be overstated.  First, it is unlikely that 
equity will be the residual claimant of the firm.  When equity is the re-
sidual claimant, the firm is solvent.  If the firm is solvent, it is unlikely 
to be in bankruptcy because it should be able to meet its obligations 
120 Because unsecured creditors implement debt compensation by handing a per-
centage of their claims to the manager, equity claimants do not bear the actual cost of 
debt compensation. 
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in full.121  As a result, debt compensation will only inefficiently skew 
managerial incentives in the rare case where a solvent firm cannot 
find financing outside of bankruptcy to resolve a liquidity crunch. 
Second, debt compensation functions as a useful corrective 
against managers’ tendency to have “interests closely aligned with the 
shareholders.”122  Under debtor-in-possession rules, the manager of 
the bankrupt firm is commonly the pre-bankruptcy manager, who was 
“only appointed due to equity concerns.”123  In addition, the manager 
frequently holds stock and stock options in the firm.  Given this back-
ground, there is a danger that managers will unduly favor the interests 
of equity.  Debt compensation combats this tendency:  rather than bi-
asing bankruptcy against equity, debt compensation brings creditors’ 
rights into greater balance with those of equity. 
Because of the risk that equity will be harmed by debt compensa-
tion, equity holders should be allowed to participate in the compensa-
tion plan.  To illustrate, suppose that the creditors’ committee of Firm 
grants debt compensation of 3%.  If equity has the option of partici-
pating, then shareholders will have the right to grant 3% of equity to 
Manager.  This ensures that Manager treats equity’s interest just as she 
treats creditors’ interests.  With the option to participate in the com-
pensation plan, equity cannot complain that its interests are harmed 
by debt compensation. 
C.  Joint Administration 
Many bankruptcies are jointly administered.124  When a parent 
company and its subsidiaries declare bankruptcy at the same time, one 
bankruptcy court will often “jointly administer” all of the bankruptcy 
proceedings for this group of companies.  Unsecured creditors of the 
different entities will often have different preferences in these circum-
stances.  For example, a holding company’s asset-to-liability ratio may 
be greater than that of its subsidiaries.125  In these circumstances, the 
goals of the holding company’s unsecured creditors will diverge from 
121 Indeed, by changing the incentives of managers in bankruptcy, debt compensa-
tion serves as a useful check against opportunistic bankruptcies by solvent firms look-
ing to use bankruptcy to alter burdensome contractual or tort obligations. 
122 BAIRD, supra note 1, at 182. 
123 Id.
124 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b)(4) (authorizing “joint administration of estates” 
involving a debtor and an affiliate). 
125 See, e.g., In re McLean Indus., 70 B.R. 852, 854 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (describ-
ing a solvent parent company and its insolvent subsidiaries). 
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those of the subsidiary’s creditors.  Courts have recognized this prob-
lem and established a general rule that, “[w]here multiple cases are 
jointly administered, multiple committees may be more appropriate” 
to protect the divergent interests of all the creditors.126
The potential conflicts among the various groups of unsecured 
creditors resemble those between senior unsecured creditors and 
general unsecured creditors discussed earlier.127  Creditors of an entity 
with a large number of assets in proportion to debts may prefer not to 
participate in a potentially expensive debt compensation plan.  Credi-
tors of less well-situated entities may see little to lose in granting the 
manager an outsize percentage.  Debt compensation procedures must 
mediate between these opposing goals. 
In jointly administered cases, the committee of unsecured credi-
tors representing the largest group of creditors by value should be en-
titled to devise a debt compensation plan.  Other committees of unse-
cured creditors should be free to opt out of this plan, just as senior 
unsecured creditors should be allowed to opt out of debt compensa-
tion.  If there is only one unsecured creditors’ committee,128 the unse-
cured creditors of each entity should be allowed to opt out of the debt 
compensation plan through a vote of all the unsecured creditors. 
This procedure allows unsecured creditors with different goals to 
adopt different solutions.  If the largest group of unsecured creditors 
holds relatively low-value claims, however, then it may attempt to grant 
the manager a particularly large percentage and force the creditors of 
the other entities to either opt out or devote an unreasonably large 
amount to managerial compensation.  Such a plan grants the man-
ager inefficient incentives to undertake overly risky projects.129  To 
prevent this occurrence, bankruptcy courts should reject plans that 
grant managers an overly generous percentage.  That a percentage is 
overly high can be determined by comparing the proportion of debt 
granted to the manager with the proportion of equity granted to 
managers in comparable firms outside of bankruptcy. 
126 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1102.02[4][a] (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th 
ed. rev. 2006). 
127 Supra Part IV.B.3. 
128 Even in jointly administered cases, there is no guarantee that multiple commit-
tees will be formed.  See, e.g., In re McLean Indus., 70 B.R. at 861-62 (describing the fac-
tors to consider in determining whether multiple committees are necessary). 
129 For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see supra Part IV.B.3. 
  
824 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 777 
 
D.  Manager Has Debt in Reorganized Company 
1.  Problems with Debt Holding by Managers 
In a reorganization, creditors receive claims against the reorgan-
ized company in exchange for their original claims against the firm.130  
The plan of reorganization divides all the creditors into different 
classes, with all the members of a particular class holding substantially 
similar claims against the bankrupt firm.131  Further, the plan deter-
mines the structure of the new claims received by each class in ex-
change for the original claims.132  The new claims against the firm re-
ceived by a class might not be the same type of claims as the original 
claims held by the class.133  For example, some creditor classes of the 
original firm might receive cash for their claims.134  Other classes 
might receive debt claims in the reorganized company in lieu of their 
original debt claims.135  Still others might be required by the plan of 
reorganization to exchange their debt claims for equity claims in the 
reorganized entity.136
With debt compensation, a manager receives a percentage of the 
debt of several classes.  For example, if senior unsecured creditors 
choose to remain in the debt compensation plan, they will undoubt-
edly constitute a different class of creditors than general unsecured 
creditors.  The different classes of creditors may well receive different 
types of claims in the reorganized firm. 
To illustrate, suppose that there are two classes of unsecured 
creditors of Firm, Class A and Class B, because Firm has issued two 
separate series of bonds with different bond indenture contracts but 
otherwise identical priority levels.  Both classes of unsecured creditors 
join in a debt compensation plan, granting Manager 3% of the face 
130 See BAIRD, supra note 1, at 203 (“[F]or the prototypical Chapter 11 case, the old 
claims against the firm disappear with the discharge and the new obligations of the 
firm take their place.”). 
131 See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2000) (indicating that “substantially similar” claims 
should be placed in the same class). 
132 See BAIRD, supra note 1, at 198-222 (describing the formation of a plan of reor-
ganization). 
133 See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(exchanging tort creditors’ pre-bankruptcy claims for beneficial interests in a trust 
consisting of cash and large equity stake in the reorganized firm). 
134 See, e.g., id. 
135 See, e.g., id. (endowing the trust with the right to receive fixed annual payments 
for a fixed duration from the reorganized firm). 
136 See, e.g., id. 
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value of debt.  Class A holds $30 million in face-value debt, while Class 
B holds $20 million.  Suppose further that Firm will have an expected 
value of $35 million after reorganization.  Finally, suppose that the 
plan of reorganization, which was confirmed, calls for Class A to re-
ceive unsecured debt in the reorganized Firm with a face value of $15 
million, while Class B receives equity in the reorganized Firm with an 
expected value of $10 million. 
Under these conditions, Manager realizes $450,000 ($450,000 = 
.03 × $15 million) in debt in the reorganized Firm (from Class A) and 
$300,000 ($300,000 =.03 × $10 million) in equity in the reorganized 
Firm (from Class B) as a result of debt compensation.  While this sce-
nario works well in ensuring that Manager designs a value-maximizing 
and nondiscriminatory plan of reorganization, Manager’s post-
reorganization incentives are skewed.  In the plan of reorganization 
just described, equity holders are the residual claimants—Firm is sol-
vent after reorganization.  Manager’s decisions primarily impact the 
equity holders’ return, and not that of the debt holders.  Manager’s 
fiduciary duty also lies with the equity holders.  In these circum-
stances, the $450,000 in debt held by Manager as a result of debt 
compensation constitutes a conflict of interest.  Although Manager’s 
fiduciary duty lies with the equity holders, Manager has a pecuniary 
incentive to maintain the value of debt as well as that of equity.  Con-
sequently, Manager may be excessively cautious, choosing to forego 
profitable but risky investment opportunities because they create a 
risk that Manager’s debt will decline in value.  If the debt compensa-
tion plan included additional classes of creditors receiving different 
types of securities, then the conflicts could grow even worse. 
2.  Responses to These Concerns 
As with many of the other critiques described in this Part, this 
concern should not be overstated.  Although managerial incentives 
are altered when managers hold debt, this problem is not unique to 
bankruptcy.  Almost every manager receives a salary, but, ultimately, 
salaries in bankruptcy resemble debt.137  Thus, all managers suffer 
137 Indeed, some aspects of managerial salaries may cause even more managerial 
risk aversion than will ordinary debt.  If the bankrupt company rejects an employment 
contract with its manager, the manager’s damages are capped by the Bankruptcy Code.  
See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (2000).  To avoid becoming constrained by this provision, 
managers may make low-risk decisions that minimize the risk of bankruptcy, but do not 
maximize value. 
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from split incentives—managers want to increase the value of equity 
to please their employers and maximize the value of their stock op-
tions; managers also strive to protect their salaries by avoiding large 
(but potentially favorable) risks.  Awarding a manager debt in the re-
organized firm through debt compensation does not create a new 
conflict of interest.  At worst, it merely contributes to a problem that 
already exists. 
In addition, managerial debt holding creates some positive incen-
tives.  When a manager holds debt, she is less likely to engage in inef-
ficiently risky behavior, secure in the knowledge that the downside 
risks are borne not by equity holders but rather by debt holders.138    
This concern looms large in reorganized companies.  Although plans 
of reorganization must convince the court that the firm will not be 
forced back into bankruptcy,139 many once-bankrupt firms wind up in 
Chapter 11 a second time.140  Granting a manager some debt reduces 
the likelihood of this occurrence—the manager has a selfish interest 
in avoiding a second bankruptcy, which would reduce the value of her 
debt holdings. 
When a manager receives both debt and equity, she has less incen-
tive to exaggerate the value of one security with respect to another in 
lobbying for the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.  If creditors 
have greater trust in the manager, reorganization will occur more rap-
idly and efficiently. 
3.  Possible Modifications to Debt Compensation 
In spite of all these positive incentives, post-reorganization debt 
holding by a manager as a result of debt compensation should be lim-
ited for the reasons discussed above.  Courts should require managers 
to sell their debt claims as soon as possible.  The larger and more liq-
uid the market for a reorganized company’s debt, the greater the 
speed with which managers should be obligated to sell their debt.141  
138 Cf. GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 11, at 569, 587 (discussing the asset substi-
tution problem and the ability of management compensation contracts to mitigate this 
problem). 
139 This “feasibility test” is established by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). 
140 Firms that return to bankruptcy a second time are called “Chapter 22s.”  For a 
study of Chapter 22s, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Pub-
lic Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York:  Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bot-
tom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001). 
141 When markets are illiquid, there is a heightened risk that a large sale by a man-
ager would not yield the true value of the debt. 
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This plan avoids forcing managers to dump all of the debt immedi-
ately in a fire-sale fashion and also allows managers to search for a 
good price.  Moreover, the price a manager receives for the debt will 
be a reflection of the market’s (typically accurate) perception of that 
manager’s performance during reorganization.142  If the market thinks 
the reorganized company is in dire straits, then that manager will re-
ceive little for the debt. 
This suggestion ameliorates the incentive-damaging effects of 
managerial debt holding after reorganization, while retaining the 
benefits of debt compensation.  Because a manager must sell her debt 
to the highest bidder in a market, she is less likely to push for a shaky 
plan of reorganization that leaves a high probability of a return to 
bankruptcy.143  In addition, there is a reduced chance that debt hold-
ing will permanently dissuade the manager from necessary risk taking 
because the manager must sell her debt as soon as possible.  While no 
plan is perfect, the requirement that a manager sell her debt as soon 
as possible after reorganization enables debt compensation to pro-
ceed without overly jeopardizing the operations of the reorganized 
company. 
E.  Change in Pre-bankruptcy Incentives 
Debt compensation also impacts pre-bankruptcy managerial in-
centives.144  When a manager knows that she is likely to receive a por-
tion of the firm’s debt should the firm enter bankruptcy, her propen-
sity to file may increase.  In addition, the manager may take a 
different view toward debt in the pre-bankruptcy period.  Although 
142 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 551-52 (1984) (discussing the relationship between in-
formation availability and market efficiency). 
143 The US Airways bankruptcy is one such case.  US Airways emerged from bank-
ruptcy in March 2003.  Just a few months later, the airline had returned to its shaky 
financial position and filed for bankruptcy a second time on September 12, 2004.  See 
Key Dates in US Airways Latest Ch. 11 Filing, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16518-2004Sep12.html (last visited Feb. 
17, 2007) (listing important developments since US Airways’ March 2003 bankruptcy). 
144 See Paul Povel, Optimal “Soft” or “Tough” Bankruptcy Procedures, 15 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 659, 660 (1999) (discussing the perceived advantages for managers of delaying 
formal bankruptcy).  Plans that would ordinarily encourage prompt bankruptcy filings 
can lead to counterintuitive results under certain circumstances.  See, e.g., Kenneth Ay-
otte & Yair Listokin, Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
403, 431-32 (2005) (finding that tort creditor priority in bankruptcy may have the per-
verse effect of harming rather than helping tort claimants in bankruptcy because tort-
creditor priority encourages managers to inefficiently delay a bankruptcy declaration). 
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both these developments are a change from the status quo, they are 
not necessarily negative.  Indeed, they may bring some welcome 
changes in managers’ pre-bankruptcy behavior. 
1.  Debt Compensation’s Impact on the Propensity To File 
Debt compensation potentially raises a manager’s total compensa-
tion during bankruptcy.145  Knowing this, a manager of a firm near 
bankruptcy self-interestedly prefers to file with debt compensation be-
cause of the prospect of a higher salary.  This tendency may be costly.  
The legal and administrative costs of bankruptcy are expensive.  In 
addition, bankruptcy sends a frightening signal to employees and 
other parties engaged with the firm.  These parties may curtail or end 
their relationship with the firm as a result of bankruptcy.146  Employ-
ees with other employment options, for example, will prefer to ex-
plore those options rather than face an uncertain future with a shaky 
organization.  By encouraging bankruptcy, debt compensation in-
creases the frequency with which these costs will be borne by the 
firm—an undesirable development. 
Avoiding bankruptcy also has some negative effects.  Firms in fi-
nancial straits suffer from uncertainty.  A supplier of a firm with dwin-
dling cash reserves may be reluctant to extend credit whether or not 
the firm has declared bankruptcy.  Furthermore, a near-bankrupt firm 
enjoys none of the protections conferred by bankruptcy.  The firm 
cannot obtain a stay against any creditor judgments, nor can it bring 
all of its claims into one forum for a rational reordering.  In addition, 
the firm cannot take advantage of DIP financing that helps reduce 
uncertainty for many suppliers and other parties contracting with the 
firm.147  By encouraging bankruptcy, debt compensation reduces 
many of these costs. 
In addition, it is not clear that debt compensation will increase the 
prevalence of bankruptcy to an undue degree.  Debt compensation 
accrues only to the manager of the bankrupt firm.  In many bank-
145 This need not be the case.  For example, the manager’s salary can be reduced 
to reflect the expected increase in compensation from a debt compensation award. 
146 The availability of DIP financing reduces these trends by ensuring that the 
debtor has enough cash to maintain everyday operations.  DIP financing cannot elimi-
nate the uncertainty associated with bankruptcy, however. 
147 For a discussion of bankruptcy’s many benefits, see BAIRD, supra note 1, at 15-
20. 
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ruptcies, the manager is fired soon after the bankruptcy declaration.148  
Even if the manager is not fired, the manager does not necessarily re-
ceive debt compensation.  Instead, the creditors’ committee makes 
this decision.  If the creditors’ committee feels that the bankruptcy 
was unwarranted, it is are unlikely to grant debt compensation to the 
manager.  Because of these considerations, the pro-bankruptcy effects 
of debt compensation should not be overstated. 
In many ways, debt compensation’s pro-bankruptcy effects are 
beneficial.  The appeal of debt compensation in bankruptcy counter-
balances the manager’s fear of dismissal as a result of bankruptcy.  
With the prospect of debt compensation, the manager will be less 
likely to resist an otherwise efficient bankruptcy to protect her posi-
tion. 
2.  Debt Compensation’s Impact on Managers’  
Treatment of Creditors Before Bankruptcy 
Debt compensation also changes the way managers will perceive 
debt as a firm approaches bankruptcy.  At present, many factors align 
the interests of managers with those of equity.149  As the firm enters 
the zone of insolvency, this tendency becomes inefficient.  Managers 
make decisions to improve the interests of equity, but their decisions 
potentially affect creditors’ interests a great deal.  In particular, man-
agers have an incentive to take on risky projects.  If the projects suc-
ceed, then bankruptcy is avoided and equity benefits.  If the projects 
fail, then creditors’ claims decline in value while equity loses little.150  
For example, suppose that Firm has $60 million in debt outstanding 
and is worth $55 million if it continues on its present course.  Man-
ager can invest in a risky project that will either make the value of the 
firm $80 million or $20 million, each with 50% probability.  The ex-
pected value of the Firm with the risky project is $50 million.  Thus, 
148 In both the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies, for example, the managers 
brought in after fraud was discovered were fired early in the bankruptcy proceed-
ings, even though they were unconnected to the fraud.  See Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Chief 
Exec’s Selection:  A Mystery to Many, CAREERJOURNAL.COM, Aug. 26, 2003, http:// 
www.careerjournal.com/columnists/managersjournal/20030826-managersjournal.html (dis-
cussing the firing of several managers in firms going bankrupt). 
149 See Hall & Liebman, supra note 95, at 654-55 (noting the linkages between 
managerial compensation and a firm’s equity interests). 
150 For examples of this pattern, see the cases cited supra note 15.  Firms in the 
zone of insolvency, by definition, have equity that is of little value.  If equity had con-
siderable value, then the firm would not be insolvent. 
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efficiency dictates that Manager should reject the risky project.  From 
equity’s perspective, however, the risky project is best.  Equity holders 
receive nothing if Firm continues on its present course, because 
Firm’s debt obligations exceed its value.  By pursuing the risky project, 
equity’s expected payoff becomes $20 million if the project succeeds 
($20 million = $80 million - $60 million) and $0 if the project fails.  If 
Manager follows equity’s interests, then Manager makes an inefficient 
decision. 
The law recognizes this danger and imposes a unique form of fi-
duciary duty upon officers of a firm in the zone of insolvency.151  
Here, officers have a fiduciary duty to maximize value rather than to 
maximize the value of equity.  This helps prevent managers from mak-
ing inefficient decisions that benefit equity but cause a greater detri-
ment to creditors. 
While the change in fiduciary duty mitigates the tendency of man-
agers to take inefficient actions as a firm becomes insolvent, it cannot 
eliminate the problem.  As a general matter, breach of fiduciary duty 
is exceedingly difficult to prove.  Unless a manager has taken truly 
outlandish risks, she will have little trouble arguing that her decisions 
were motivated by a desire to maximize value. 
Debt compensation in bankruptcy improves the incentives of 
managers to make efficient decisions before bankruptcy.  The plan 
accomplishes this goal by effectively granting the creditors some over-
sight of the manager.  With debt compensation, decisions that hurt 
the value of debt potentially hurt the manager.  Any given percentage 
of debt will be worth less if the manager makes inefficient decisions 
before bankruptcy.  In addition, the manager knows that the creditors 
will decide whether or not to adopt debt compensation, as well as the 
appropriate percentage award.  Creditors are unlikely to award debt 
compensation if they feel that the manager has made inefficient deci-
sions in the pre-bankruptcy period.  Anticipating these effects, the 
manager has less of an interest in engaging in the overly risky behav-
ior that commonly characterizes the pre-bankruptcy period.  Thus, 
debt compensation aligns the pecuniary interests of the manager with 
her fiduciary duties before bankruptcy as well as within it.  For this 
reason, debt compensation’s benefits extend well beyond bankruptcy. 
151 See Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that, under 
Delaware law, officers and directors of an insolvent firm owe a fiduciary duty to their 
corporation’s creditors); see also cases cited supra note 15 (exemplifying courts’ recog-
nition that creditors are common residual claimants, and are owed fiduciary duties as a 
result). 
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F.  Cautious Implementation Should Prevent 
 the Worst Abuses of Debt Compensation 
The previous Sections examined several potential shortcomings of 
debt compensation.  While each shortcoming can be adequately ad-
dressed, the advantages of debt compensation can be fully obtained 
only with competent judicial decision making.  Without such judicial 
capabilities, the risks identified here may transform debt compensa-
tion from a powerful new tool for managerial compensation in bank-
ruptcy into a windfall for unscrupulous managers and creditors.152
None of the criteria suggested above for judicial approval or rejec-
tion of a debt compensation plan appear unworkable.  For example, 
overly generous debt compensation plans should be easy to identify 
and reject.  If the debt compensation percentage is well above the 
norms for incentive compensation in comparable firms outside of 
bankruptcy, then the debt compensation plan should be struck down.  
This standard should prevent the most outrageous and inefficient 
debt compensation plans from occurring.  But what of debt compen-
sation plans that appear high, but still may be defensible?  Such debt 
compensation schemes might be efficient, and it is much harder for 
judges to determine their value.  Until bankruptcy courts have seen a 
number of debt compensation plans in action, it will be difficult to 
know whether a plan is value maximizing or not. 
Because of this difficulty, bankruptcy courts should adopt a cau-
tious stance with regards to debt compensation plans until they are 
well established.  So long as judges lack experience with debt compen-
sation plans, they should reject any such plan that appears question-
able, even if the plan may be value maximizing.  As judges grow more 
comfortable with the mechanics of debt compensation, they can ex-
pand the range of approved debt compensation plans in accordance 
with their practiced judgment. 
Cautious adoption of debt compensation offers several advan-
tages.  By allowing only modest deviations from the status quo, cau-
tious adoption ensures that debt compensation will not engender any 
unforeseen disasters, allowing judges to develop some comfort with 
debt compensation while the stakes are reasonably low.  Similarly, cau-
152 Even without competent judicial decision making, the chances of such an out-
come should be less in the case of debt compensation than in the case of other forms 
of managerial compensation in bankruptcy.  See supra Part III.C.  For an example of 
the view held among some scholars that executive compensation more generally is a 
windfall for unscrupulous managers, see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 137-46. 
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tious adoption will allow judges to learn which of the potential dan-
gers described above, if any, are relevant in practice while the costs of 
mistakes are at their smallest.  Procedures to address any potential 
flaws can then be developed.  Finally, cautious adoption will enable 
bankruptcy practitioners to grow comfortable with debt compensa-
tion. 
The standards for judicial review of debt compensation articulated 
in this Part, combined with cautious adoption of debt compensation, 
should enable the realization of the considerable benefits of debt 
compensation at minimum cost and risk. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes a new form of incentive compensation in 
bankruptcy that constitutes an improvement over existing compensa-
tion plans and proposals.  Granting the unsecured creditors’ commit-
tee the right to offer debt compensation to managers institutes much 
better incentives for value-maximizing managerial performance.  Debt 
compensation creates incentives for managers to self-interestedly 
maximize the value of the firm rather than attempt to protect their 
own jobs or favor one class of creditors over another.  As a result, debt 
compensation offers a potentially important new method for improv-
ing managerial performance during bankruptcy, when managerial 
performance assumes a more critical role.  Debt compensation comes 
with some pitfalls, however.  For debt compensation to realize its po-
tential, judges must be vigilant against those attempting to abuse debt 
compensation for inefficient ends.  This task is not intractable, how-
ever, and debt compensation’s potentially prodigious benefits make 
the risks worth bearing. 
More generally, debt compensation is an example of the potential 
for CEO compensation to improve bankruptcy performance.  Just as 
scholars of solvent companies place a heavy emphasis on the role of 
CEO compensation in corporate governance, so too should scholarly 
attention be redirected toward the subject of compensation in bank-
ruptcy. 
 
